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NOTES
Products Liability
WHY THE EUROPEAN UNION DOESN'T NEED THE
RESTATEMENT (THIRDY
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1999, shortly after completing their work on the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
(Restatement), Professors Jim Henderson and Aaron Twerski
published an article arguing that "recent substantive law
developments in Europe, Japan, and elsewhere, taken at face
value, suggest that the lessons learned the hard way in the
United States have in certain important aspects been lost on
the international legal community."' The article focused on
what the authors saw as the "potential sources of distraction"'
that exist in current European' and Japanese' substantive law,
and predicted that "[s]ignificant adjustments will probably be
required"' before lawyers and judges can "respond to products
© 2004 Rebekah Rollo. All Rights Reserved.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1998) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
2 James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, What Europe, Japan and
Other Countries Can Learn from the New American Restatement of Products Liability,
34 TEx. INTL. L.J. 1, 2 (1999).
3 Id. at 12-20.
' See Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the Approximation of
the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States
Concerning Liability for Defective Products, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29 [hereinafter EU
Directive].
5 Japanese law is beyond the scope of this Note.
6 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 2, at 2. Interestingly, in the sixteen
years between the adoption of the EU Directive and the Commission's most recent
survey asking member states and other interested parties about changes they would
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liability claims rationally, consistently and fairly."7 Professors
Henderson and Twerski then suggested that the Restatement
could "play a helpful role in making the necessary
adjustments."
This Note seeks to do more than take recent substantive
developments in European Union (EU)9 products liability law
"at face value.""0 Instead, it seeks to delve deeper by focusing on
EU products liability law through the lens of recent
developments in Germany's domestic products liability law,
particularly since the implementation of the Product Liability
Act," whereby German legislators brought their domestic
products liability law into compliance with EU law as
presented to member states in the form of the Products
Liability Directive (EU Directive). 2 Specifically, this Note
analyzes how German law defines "defect" and how it assigns
liability in products liability suits - two of the "potential
sources of distraction" 3 that Professors Henderson and Twerski
predicted would necessitate a closer examination of the
Restatement before EU products liability law could be fairly
and rationally implemented. It argues that, in the area of how
defects are defined, substantive developments in German
products liability law have been almost identical to the
like to see made, not one significant change has been made or even seriously
considered. In fact, instead of focusing on changing the Directive's broad definition of
"defect" or assigning liability on grounds other than strict liability, the only change
that has been seriously considered is extending the statute of limitations for products
that are intended for long-term use or consumption. Report from the Commission on
the Application of Directive 85/374 on Liability for Defective Products, COM(00)893
final at 20-21 [hereinafter Commission Report].
7 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 2, at 3.
8 Id.
9 On November 1, 1993, with the ratification of the Treaty on the European
Union, the European Community (EC), also known as the European Economic
Community (EEC), was officially placed under the broader umbrella organization
known as the European Union (EU). TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, 1997
O.J. (C 340) 145, as amended by TREATY OF AMSTERDAM, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 1
(1997). For purposes of consistency, and to avoid confusion, this Note will refer only to
the European Union (EU).
'0 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 2, at 2.
" Gesetz fiber die Haftung fir fehlerhafte Produkte (Produkthaftungsgesetz)
v. 15.12.1989 (BGB1. I S.2198) [hereinafter Product Liability Act]. For an excellent
English translation of the Product Liability Act, presented alongside the original
German text, see WILLIAM C. HOFFMAN & SUSANNE HILL-ARNING, GUIDE TO PRODUCT
LIABILITY IN EUROPE 154-61 (1994). Alternatively, see Germany: Law Concerning
Liability for Defective Products, 32 I.L.M. 1369 (Sandra N. Hurd & Frances E. Zollers,
trans. 1993).
12 EU Directive, supra note 4.
13 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 2, at 12.
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developments in the United States, thereby eliminating the
need to look to the Restatement for innovative and unique
solutions. Additionally, when it comes to assigning liability,
this Note argues that while there are obvious similarities in
the development of U.S. and German law, German substantive
law, in conjunction with German procedure, will prove a more
valuable guide than the Restatement. Ultimately, this Note
concludes that, because of the strong similarities between the
Restatement and German products liability law, and because of
the nexus between German substantive law and procedure,
German products liability law can provide the Commission1'
with a comprehensive guide that rivals the Restatement should
the Commission find it necessary to make any "significant
adjustments"' to EU products liability law.
In order to better illuminate the similarities and
differences between U.S. and German products liability law,
this Note initially describes the current state of each country's
substantive law. Part II focuses on the main sources of U.S.
and German products liability law. Part III examines how
defective products are defined. Part IV explores how liability is
assigned. Part V then compares and contrasts the two
countries' approaches to products liability law in light of
fundamental procedural differences. Finally, Part VI concludes
that at least when it comes to defining defects and assigning
liability, German products liability law provides the
Commission with as much substantive guidance as the
Restatement, and does so with a framework better suited to the
civil law tradition of the majority of EU member states.16
14 The Commission is the European Union's executive body. As such it is
responsible for "implementing the European legislation (directives, regulations,
decisions), budget and programmes adopted by Parliament and the Council." See
European Commission, at http://www.europa.eu.int/institutions/comm/
print index en.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2004).
15 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 2, at 2.
16 While the developments in domestic German law can be confusing because
of the dual system through which it has evolved, discussed infra Part II.B, substantive
German law can rival, or even surpass, the Restatement (Third) as a guide to future
changes in EU products liability law. It can provide the Commission with an internal,
versus external, solution to any shortcomings it discovers in the EU Directive. The
advantages of an internal solution extend to most stages of development. Not only does
the basic legal framework exist, but it has been adopted and applied under conditions
that are largely similar to those that already exist throughout most of the EU.(Thirteen of the fifteen EU member states have civil law systems, as do the ten
candidate countries that are expected to join in June 2004. Ireland and the United
Kingdom, with the exception of Scotland, are the only two EU member states with
common law systems.). Additionally, there exists an exhaustive collection of scholarly
writings by some of the very scholars who will play an integral role in the law's
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
II. SOURCES OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW
One obvious difference between the two legal systems is
the fact that the United States has a common law system,
while Germany has a civil law system." As such, the primary
sources of legal authority in each country are very different. In
the United States, attorneys, judges, and scholars generally
look to case law as the primary authority on common law
issues. In Germany, as in other civil law countries, it is the
civil code that carries the most weight.'8 However, although in
theory each system gives greater weight to a different source of
authority, in practice neither system relies exclusively on a
single source. In the United States, scholarly works and
treatises are at times cited by courts as sources of authority. 9
Similarly, in Germany, case law can have a dramatic influence
on the manner in which the civil code is interpreted and
enforced."0 The remainder of this section discusses the main
sources of U.S. and German products liability law, focusing on
the historical development of each source.
A. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
One series of treatises that have a special place in the
U.S. legal system are the Restatements. They are produced by
the American Law Institute (ALI), a private organization
whose members are prominent legal practitioners, judges and
development; a number of German judges, who are largely responsible for interpreting
EU law on a domestic level, are already familiar with the strengths, weaknesses and
minutiae of the existing law. Additionally, although procedural rules in most EU
countries would prevent the same thing from happening, the horror with which many
Europeans view the huge monetary awards handed down by some U.S. juries would
make an internal, more familiar solution more palatable to a broader spectrum of EU
citizens.
1 NIGEL G. FOSTER & SATISH SULE, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWS 3 (3d
ed. 2002).
IS Id. at 5-7.
'9 For example, since the first Restatement was published in 1932,
Restatements have been cited in 161,486 cases, 929 of which were at the Supreme
Court level. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT (2004), available at
http://www.ali.org/ali/AM04-07-RestatementCitationsO4.pdf.
20 "The BGB is today enveloped by thick layers of case law which anybody
who wishes to apply the law has to be thoroughly familiar with." Reinhard
Zimmerman, An Introduction to German Legal Culture, in INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN
LAW 1, 16 (Werner F. Ebke & Matthew W. Finkin eds., 1996). "lUnusually for a civil
law country, [case law] provides the most guidance" in the area of German products
liability law. Richard Best, A Comparison of Civil Liability for Defective Products in the
United Kingdom and Germany, 3 GERMAN L.J., at para. 41 (2002), available at
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=144.
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academics.2 Organized in 1923, ALI's bylaws state that the
organization's purpose is "to promote the clarification and
simplification of the law and its better adaptation to social
needs, to secure the better administration of justice, and to
encourage and carry on scholarly and scientific legal work."22
ALI does this by adopting and publishing treatises that consist
of statements of the "blackletter" law, accompanied by
comments and illustrations derived largely from recent
developments in case law. These texts are the result of
exhaustive analysis and often passionate debate." Because they
are sources of secondary authority, they are not binding on
common law courts; however, they have unquestioned influence
in both resolving ongoing debates and predicting future legal
trends within the United States.2
In the area of products liability law, the Restatements
(Second)" and (Third)" have monitored and evaluated the
" See American Law Institute, About The American Law Institute, at
http://www.ali.org/ali/thisali.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2004).
" See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, BYLAWS OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
(1994), available at http://www.ali.org/ali/BYLAWS2001.htm. In Europe, the Vienna-
based European Centre of Tort and Insurance Law (ECTIL) is grappling with similar
issues and has a similar purpose. Instead of "Restatements," ECTIL's focus is on
drafting "Principles of European Tort Law" with the aim of creating a "foundation for
discussing a future harmonization of the law of tort in the European Union, above all
with respect to a possible codification of European Private Law." See ECTIL,
Introduction, at para. 3, at httpJ/www.ectil.org/content/ectilintro2.htm (last visited
Feb. 2, 2004). Additionally, ECTIL intends its "Principles" to "form a stimulus for both
academics and practitioners" and possibly even act as "a guide for national legal
systems, thereby leading to gradual harmonization." Id. In addition to leading
European scholars, ECTIL also counts the U.S.-based scholars Dan B. Dobbs and the
late Gary T. Schwartz among its members. The most recent volume in the "Principles"
series, UNIFICATION OF TORT LAW: STRICT LIABILITY (B.A. Koch & H. Kozoil eds., 2002),
examines "the common grounds of strict liability in the various legal systems" and
"provides the academic and the practitioner with the fundamental issues of strict
liability in the countries covered." Id. at back cover.
23 For a more detailed discussion of the Restatement drafting procedures, see
American Law Institute, About the American Law Institute, at
http://www.ali.orglali/thisali.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2004).
24 An interesting question, and one without an easy answer, is whether
Restatements merely summarize the current state of the law and present it in an
easily accessible format, or whether they actually influence the development of the law
in a similar manner and to a similar degree as do scholarly writings in civil law
countries. While it is difficult to deduce their real impact, because ALI tracks and
records the cumulative number of published cases citing various Restatements, it is
possible to get a sense of their far-reaching influence. In its 2004 Annual Report, ALI
reported that as of March 1, 2004, the Restatement of Torts had been cited in a total of
67,336 cases, 306 of which were at the Supreme Court level. See AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, supra note 19.
25 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)].
26 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1.
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evolution of U.S. case law since the mid-1940s" However, the
first case in a series of decisions that eventually eliminated the
hurdles posed by negligence and contract law, and lead to the
development of what we now call "products liability" law, came
down decades earlier. In 1916, Judge Cardozo's decision in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co."8 "substantially abolished the
privity rule for negligence cases."' While Cardozo's decision in
MacPherson"° greatly reduced the plaintiffs elemental burden,
other hurdles remained. Plaintiffs may have been freed from
the privity requirement, but they could still only recover
against manufacturers "for negligence,... [and] negligence of a
manufacturer . . .remained difficult to prove. " "1 To avoid the
difficult, if not impossible, task of proving a manufacturer's
negligence, plaintiffs "sometimes sued for breach of express
warranty,"" which "would have made the manufacturer liable
in contract without proof of fault."33 Unfortunately, few
manufacturers expressly guaranteed that the use of their
products would not result in injury. As a result, consumers
began to urge "that the sale of goods implied a warranty."35
Eventually, the Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform
Commercial Code both adopted rules that codified an implied
warranty of merchantability, thereby relieving plaintiffs of the
burden of showing that manufacturers had breached an explicit
warranty to produce a reasonably safe product."6 As a result,
plaintiffs could proceed without having to prove fault, which is
still a requirement under negligence; however, they were again
27 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Cumm. Supp. 2002).
217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). The plaintiff in this case was injured
when the wheel of his new car collapsed. Because the plaintiff had purchased the car
from a retailer, not the manufacturer, he did not have privity with the manufacturer.
The privity rule was originally established in Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep.
402 (Exch. P1. 1842), and, as a result, for over 150 years courts held that "a negligent
manufacturer was definitely not subject to liability for a defective product when the
injured victim was not the person who had purchased the product." DAN B. DOBBS, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 353, 973 (2000). Nevertheless, Judge Cardozo rejected this long-
standing requirement and permitted the plaintiff to proceed with the suit, reasoning
that, if the manufacturer "is negligent, where danger is to be foreseen, a liability will
follow." MacPherson, 217 N.Y. at 390, 111 N.E. at 1053.
29 DOBBS, supra note 28, § 353 at 973.
30 MacPherson, 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
31 DOBBS, supra note 28, § 353 at 973.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34Id.
35 Id.
36 See UNIF. SALES ACT § 15, U.L.A. app. I, at 8 (1968); U.C.C. § 2-314 (1998).
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confronted by a privity requirement that still existed for
warranty-based claims.
By the end of the first half of the twentieth century,
wide-spread acceptance of the MacPherson decision had
removed the privity requirement for plaintiffs seeking to bring
suits in negligence, but plaintiffs still had to show fault.
Similarly, wide-spread acceptance of uniform sales codes had
lead to the statutory creation of an implied warranty of
merchantability that relieved plaintiffs in contract-based suits
of the burden of showing that an express breach of warranty
had been violated. Nevertheless, absent an exception, the
privity requirement remained. Then, in 1960, the decision in
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.37 ushered in what many
now view as a new era of U.S. products liability law. In
Henningsen, despite the existence of a contractual disclaimer of
any implied or express warranties, the court held that
"[n]either the absence of privity nor the presence of contractual
limitations on the manufacturer's responsibility would bar the
claim."' However, while this marked the beginning of a new,
plaintiff-friendly era of products liability law, courts and
plaintiffs continued to face the lingering problem of contractual
privity, which continued to be a hurdle when a plaintiff
brought a breach of warranty suit. Finally, in the 1963 case
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.," Justice Traynor
eliminated the privity problem. He held that manufacturers of
defective products were strictly liable not as a matter of
contract law, but rather as a matter of tort law."0 Justice
Traynor's use of strict liability in conjunction with defective
products quickly caught on and by the mid-1960s was formally
incorporated" into section 402A of the Restatement (Second). 4
37 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). The plaintiff in this case was injured after an
accident that occurred when the car's steering malfunctioned. The car was so badly
damaged it was impossible to tell exactly whether 'any of the parts of the steering
wheel mechanism or workmanship or assembly were defective or improper prior to the
accident." Id. at 75. The case was brought under both negligence and implied warranty,
but "the negligence counts were dismissed by the court and the cause was submitted to
the jury for determination solely on the issues of implied warranty of merchantability."
Id. at 73.
3 DOBBS, supra note 28, § 353 at 974.
39 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). The plaintiff in this case was seriously injured
when a piece of wood he was lathing on one of the defendant's combination power tools
suddenly broke free and struck him in the head. Id. at 898.
40 DOBBS, supra note 28, § 353 at 974.
41 Id.
42 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 25, § 402A.
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After over thirty years of intervening case law that at
times lead to astronomical damage awards, the Restatement
(Third) set forth a much more refined analysis of U.S. products
liability law. And it is this Restatement, the accumulation of
almost a century's worth of "lessons learned the hard way, ""
that Professors Henderson and Twerski recommend as the
source to which the Commission should look when it considers
making substantive changes to EU products liability law.
B. Bidrgerliches Gesetzbuch/ German Civil Code
Because Germany is a civil law country, statutes are the
primary source of law." German law is largely codified in the
Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB)."' The BGB is the "most
important source of [German] private law,"6 and "[miountains
of literature have been compiled on every detail."" One of the
sections that has been documented, analyzed, and debated in
minute detail is Section 823.8 The "catch-all provision for tort
claims, [and] the leading tort provision in and outside of the
products liability field," Section 823 comprises two paragraphs
that at first glance are misleadingly simple.' Yet, because they
43 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 2, at 2.
4 In Germany, the generally accepted hierarchy of written law is the
Grundgesetz (Basic Law or Constitution); Bundesgesetze (federal statutes and codes) of
which the Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch ("BGB") (Civil Code) is the central codification;
Rechtsverordnungen (delegated statutory decrees); Satzungen (bylaws of federal
organs); and, to a limited degree, statutes and regulations at the Ldnder (provincial
state) level. FOSTER & SULE, supra note 17, at 36.
45 In an excellent example of the German love of both symbolism and
precision, the BGB originally took effect on January 1, 1900. Zimmerman, supra note
20, at 6-7. Viewing that day as the beginning of a symbolic new era, the headline of the
Deutsche Juristenzeitung, a legal newspaper, read "Ein Volk. Ein Reich. Ein Recht."
(One People. One Empire. One Law.). Id. at 7. On January 1, 2002, a dramatic revision
of the BGB, in the form of the Act on the Modernization of the Law of Obligations, took
effect. Hans Schulte-Nolke, The New German Law of Obligations: An Introduction, at
http://www.iuscomp.orgtgla/literature/schulte-noelke.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
Despite the broad scope of the reforms, many of the basic Delikt (tort) provisions,
including Section 823, the key section for German tort and products liability law, were
left untouched.
46 HOWARD D. FISHER, THE GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND LEGAL LANGUAGE 27
(3d ed. 2002).
47 Zimmerman, supra note 20, at 7.
4 § 823 BGB. For a comprehensive English-language survey of German tort
law, see BASIL S. MARKESINIS & HANNES UNBERATH, THE GERMAN LAW OF TORTS: A
COMPARATIVE TREATISE (4th ed. 2002).
49 Manfred Wandt, German Approaches to Product Liability, 34 TEX. INTL.
L.J. 71, 73 (1999).
'o The two paragraphs of Section 832 read as:
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provide different grounds for assigning liability, Section 823's
two paragraphs have lead to an intricate system of parallel but
not necessarily mutually exclusive remedies.
The first paragraph of Section 823 (Paragraph I) is a
general provision that a litigant may invoke when one of the
enumerated absolute rights is violated." These absolute rights
include one's life, body, health, freedom, property, or other
right, the violation of which entitles the injured party to
compensation. 2 Section 823's second paragraph (Paragraph II)
also entitles an injured party to compensation.' However,
unlike Paragraph I, it does not include a list of enumerated
rights; rather, the right to compensation depends upon the
violation of a Schutzgesetz (protective law) that has been
specifically enacted for the protection of others.' As a result of
the BGB's distinction between these two very different grounds
for assigning liability, German products liability law has a
decidedly two-pronged approach."
A person who willfully or negligently injures the life, body, health,
freedom, property, or other right of another contrary to law is bound to
compensate him for any damage arising therefrom.
The same obligation attaches to a person who infringes a statutory
provision intended for the protection of others. If according to the purview of
the statute infringement is possible even without fault, the duty to make
compensation arises only if some fault can be imputed to the wrongdoer.
§ 823 BGB, translated in MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 43, at 14.
51 § 823 I BGB, translated in MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 48, at 14.
52 Id.
§ 823 II BGB, translated in MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 48, at 14.
54 Id.
Traditionally, § 823 I BGB has been the leading provision through which
German plaintiffs brought tort claims. However, the ever-increasing number of
statutes that have been introduced for the protection of others have given new impetus
to § 823 II BGB. See, e.g., Product Liability Act, supra note 11; Gesetz fiber den
Verkehr mit Arzneimitteln (Arzneimittelgesetz) v. 24.8.1976 (BGBl. I S.2445) in der
Fassung der Bekanntmachung v. 19.10.1994 (BGBI I S.3018), zuletzt geandert durch
Ges. v. 25.2.1998 (BGBI I S.374) [hereinafter Pharmaceutical Products Act]. See also
MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 48, at 43.
Calling it a "fatal error," German legal scholars were deriding the two-
prong approach as early as 1889.
There thus exist two systems ruled by completely different spirits: a system
of the general civil law that contains the 'pure' private law, and a mass of
special laws in which a private law, tarnished by and blended with public
law, governs .... What a fatal abyss opens before us! What a schism between
the spirit of the normal administration of justice and the administrative
jurisdiction that is being extended further and further! What a ... danger of
stagnation and degeneration of jurisprudence.
ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN & JAMES RUSSEL GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 693 (2d ed. 1977) (quoting 0.
GIERKE, DIE SOCIALE AUFGABE DES PRIVATRECHTS 16-17 (1889)).
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Paragraph I was first successfully pressed into use as a
provision under which one could seek relief for products
liability claims in 1968, when the Bundesgerrichtshof (Federal
Supreme Court), made its landmark decision in the Fowl Pest
Case.' Previously, products liability actions brought under
Paragraph I failed because the plaintiff inevitably could not
prove the defendant's fault. 7 However, the Court in the Fowl
Pest Case for the first time reversed the burden of proof, in
large part because it could not find an adequate remedy under
any of the consumer protection theories scholars had developed
using the BGB's contractual and quasi-contractual provisions.'
BGHZ 51, 91 (Huihnerpest) [hereinafter Fowl Pest Case]. For an English
translation, see MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 48, at 555-64. For an alternative
translation, presented side-by-side with the original German text, see RAYMOND
YOUNGS, SOURCEBOOK ON GERMAN LAw 439-67 (2d ed. 2002).
The plaintiff in the Fowl Pest Case, a chicken farmer, brought suit when
fowl pest (Newcastle Disease) broke out on her farm just days after her chickens were
inoculated using the defendants' vaccine. As a result, more than 4,000 chickens died
and an additional 100 had to be slaughtered. Fowl pest also broke out on three other
farms where chickens had been inoculated with vaccine from the same batch. The
Court found that the defendants' vaccine manufacturing process lacked adequate
assurances for the uniform production of the vaccine and allowed for an unacceptably
high possibility of human error. BGHZ 51, 91.
" Klaus Vieweg, The Law of Torts, in INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW 197,
217 (Werner F. Ebke & Matthew W. Finkin eds., 1996).
BGHZ 51, 91. Before reversing the burden of proof to allow recovery under
§823 I BGB, the Court rejected recovery under a variety of theories, including § 278
BGB's contract-based claim of Drittschadensliquidation (damage suffered by third
persons); the theoretical Haftung des Warenherstellers (strict liability for
manufacturers without reference to fault); warranty; social contract; an "attempt to
derive a producer's liability from the general rule in § 242 BGB"; and, finally, "a special
quasi-contractual relation between the manufacturer and user, resting on a statute
and developed from the notion of confidence." MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 48,
at 555-64.
Standing alone, the Court's dismissal of these other theories in favor of a
reversal of the burden of proof to allow recovery under § 823 I BGB was
groundbreaking. It was all the more radical because the plaintiff had also brought suit,
and had already met the lesser burden of proof, under § 823 II BGB and the
Pharmaceutical Products Act, supra note 55. Despite this, and in a move that
revolutionized German products liability law as much as Justice Traynor's holding in
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963), the Court also
declared that the reversal of the burden of proof that was mandated by the
Pharmaceutical Products Act "would . . . also apply if the plaintiff could here base a
claim for damages only on § 823 I BGB. In that case also it would be for the defendant
to exonerate itself." MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 48, at 561. The Court
acknowledged that under § 823 I BGB the plaintiff must normally show not only the
causal connection between the harm she suffered and the actions of the defendant, but
also the defendant's fault. However, the Court then proceeded with analysis that is
very similar to the common-law concept of res ipsa loquitur, defined infra note 152,
whereby it recognized that modern manufacturing methods make it practically
impossible for a plaintiff to show at exactly what point the manufacturer was
negligent. As a result, the Court concluded that, "if the unknown cause lies within the
scope of the producer, it is also within the scope of his risks. In that case it is
[Vol. 69:31082
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Instead of requiring the plaintiff to show that the negligence of
the vaccine producers harmed her, the court required the
defendant-manufacturers to show that their negligence did not
cause the plaintiffs harm." Like the chain of U.S. cases
culminating in Henningsen' and Greenman," the Fowl Pest
Case"' ushered in a new era of German products liability law.
By recognizing the practical impossibility of proving negligence
when confronted with modern manufacturing methods, the
Court shifted the burden of proof to the party who could best
meet that burden, thereby greatly increasing the likelihood
that plaintiffs could establish a prima facie case.
Unlike plaintiffs bringing claims under Paragraph I,
those who were able to bring claims under Paragraph II
benefited from an automatic reversal of the burden of proof as
early as 1838.' However, as mentioned above, unlike claims
brought under Paragraph I, Paragraph II may only be invoked
upon the violation of a protective statute. The
Produkthaftungsgesetz (Product Liability Act)" is the protective
statute most relevant here. Adopted in 1989 in conjunction
appropriate and expected of him that the risk of not being able to prove his innocence
should lie with him." MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 48, at 562.
59 BGHZ 51, 91. The Court did not, however, want the decision to be
construed as an introduction of strict liability under § 823 I BGB and went on to
clarify:
The reversal of the burden of allegation and proof ordered in these provisions
does not always proceed from a presumption of fault in the doer of damage. It
rests in the main on the thought that the doer is in a better position than the
injured party to throw light on the events relevant to the charge of
negligence, so that it is just to impose on him the risk of being unable to do
SO.
MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 48, at 562, 563.
6 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
61 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
62 BGHZ 51, 91.
63 MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 48, at 724. In the first of what would
become an ever-increasing number of protective statutes, section 35 of the 1838
Preufiisches Eisenbahngesetz (Prussian Railways Act) imposed "strict liability for harm
to persons or property 'resulting from carriage on the railway." Id. In 1978, after a
series of evolutionary revisions that include the Reichshaftpflichtgesetz (Imperial
Insurance Act of 1871), the 1838 statute took its most recent form as the
Haftpflichtgesetz (Strict Liability Act). Id. Intended to protect people from many of the
hazards associated with living in a modern, industrial society, today the Strict Liability
Act is one of Germany's leading protective statutes. See id. at 25.
64 Product Liability Act, supra note 11. The Product Liability Act took effect
on January 1, 1990, exactly ninety years after the enactment of the BGB. Id. § 19.
Another very important products liability statute under Paragraph II is
the Pharmaceutical Products Act, supra note 55. Unfortunately, it is an exceedingly
complicated and technical piece of legislation and an in-depth analysis is beyond the
scope of this Note. However, where it is practical, brief discussions of relevant elements
have been integrated into the footnotes.
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with the E.U.'s Product Liability Directive,' the text of the
Product Liability Act "follows [that ofi the E.U. Directive very
closely. "'
The protective statutes that provide remedies under
Paragraph II generally do not replace or usurp causes of action
brought under Paragraph I. For example, domestic versions of
the E.U. Directive "take the form of an extension of or a
supplement to the individual [country's] product liability rules,
.. so that the [country's] rules remain in force without
change."" To this end, both the E.U. Directive' and the Product
Liability Act"' specifically provide that an injured party's rights
under alternative domestic laws are not affected.
Together, Paragraphs I and II of Section 823 are the
main sources of German products liability law. And it is from
this wellspring - instead of the Restatement - that the
Commission can draw when it seeks guidance concerning the
future development of E.U. products liability law.
III. DEFINING PRODUCT DEFECTS
With that background set, this Part will discuss how
product defects are defined under the Restatement and the
BGB, respectively. The first section will highlight the
differences between the Restatement (Third) and its
predecessor, the Restatement (Second), while the second
section will focus on the differences between Paragraphs I and
II of Section 823.
EU Directive, supra note 4.
HOFFMAN & HILL-ARNING, supra note 11, at 27.
67 Michael Christiani Havemann, The EC Directive on Product Liability: Its
Background, Aims and System, in PRODUCT LIABILITY: PREVENTION, PRACTICE AND
PROCESS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 17, 18 (Rudolph Hulsenbek & Dennis
Campbell eds., 1989).
EU Directive, supra note 4, art. 13. It must be noted, however, that while
plaintiffs may bring suit based on multiple grounds, to be successful they must be able
to independently establish the elements of each claim. Plaintiffs cannot use the
outcome of one claim as the foundation for another. Peter Borer, Bringt uns die EG-
Richtlinie zur Produktehaftung "amerikanische Verhaltnisse"?, in US AND EEC
PRODUCT LIABILITY: ISSUES AND TRENDS 105, 123 (Roger Zach ed., 1989). Similarly, the
Restatement also specifically provides for the pursuit of alternative grounds for
recovery, as long as the grounds for each are independently established. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 1, § 1 cmt. A, § 2 cmt. n.
69 Product Liability Act, supra note 11, § 15(2). The Pharmaceutical Products
Act also specifically provides German plaintiffs with an alternative, not exclusive,
cause of action. Pharmaceutical Products Act, supra note 55, § 91. It should be noted,
however, that the Product Liability Act cannot be used as an alternative cause of action
for pharmaceutical-related claims. Product Liability Act, supra note 11, § 15(1).
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A. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
Perhaps the most obvious difference between the
Restatement (Third) and its predecessor is the specificity with
which the Restatement (Third) defines the concept of a product
defect." The Restatement (Second)" simply states that liability
extends to "[olne who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user."2 By contrast, the
Restatement (Third) devotes an entire section, replete with
eighteen comments and twenty illustrations, to discussing
three specific "categories of product defect": manufacturing,
design, and warning. 3 Each is examined in turn.
1. Manufacturing Defects
Manufacturing defects affect individual product units
and arise when a "product departs from its intended design
even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation
and marketing of the product."" The rule is fairly self-
explanatory and, when compared to the depth with which they
discussed design and warning defects, the Reporters wasted
little ink offering further clarification or illustrations on this
point."
Many of the innumerable changes in U.S. products liability law that took
place in the thirty-three years between publication of the Restatement (Second) and
Restatement (Third) are beyond the scope of this Note. However, the final supplement
to the Restatement (Second) and the Reporters' Notes in the Restatement (Third)
provide excellent documentation of the most important cases and commentaries.
71 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 25.
72 Id. § 402A. It is not until comment g that there is any discussion of what is
meant by "[diefective condition," and even then, instead of a definition, the reader is
simply presented with the language of the rule itself. Id. § 402A cmt. g (clarifying that
the plaintiff has the burden of proving that "the product was in a defective condition at
the time it left the hands" of the manufacturer). Comment h provides some additional
clarification by specifying that liability does not extend to injuries arising from the
.abnormal handling" of a product that is "safe for normal handling and consumption."
Id. § 402A cmt. h. Additionally, comment h recognizes that it is not only harmful
ingredients that can make a product defective, but that defects can also arise in the
context of packaging, pre-sale deterioration, and the presence of foreign objects. Id. §
402A cmt. h (explaining that a "defective condition may arise not only from harmful
ingredients, not characteristic of the product itself either as to the presence or
quantity, but also from foreign objects contained in the product, from decay or
deterioration before sale, or from the way in which the product is prepared or packed").
73 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 2 (Categories of Product Defect).
74 Id. § 2(a). For a discussion of the liability-related aspects of manufacturing
defects see infra Part IV.A.1.
75 Interestingly, the illustrations that relate specifically to manufacturing
defects are based on a fact pattern that is almost identical to the best-known chain of
German manufacturing defect cases. The two illustrations that accompany comment c
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It should be noted that when the Restatement (Second)
was drafted in the early 1960s, U.S. products liability law and
the Restatement (Second) focused almost exclusively on
manufacturing defects."' As a result, the law surrounding this
type of defect is fairly settled."
2. Design Defects
Design defects affect an entire line of products and arise
when "the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could
have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable
alternative design . . . and the omission of the alternative
design renders the product not reasonably safe."78  The
Restatement (Third) distinguishes between manufacturing and
design defects by observing that, whereas manufacturing
defects arise when an individual product unit fails to meet the
manufacturer's own design specifications, design defects arise
when an entire product line "meets the manufacturer's design
specifications but raises the question whether the
specifications themselves create unreasonable risks."79
Unlike the law surrounding manufacturing defects, the
Restatement (Third) acknowledges that the law surrounding
design defects is far from settled.' The general requirement
that plaintiffs prove the existence of a "reasonable alternative
design"" has added to the confusion surrounding design defects.
are based on an exploding bottle of Champaign. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, §
2 cmt. c, illus. 1 and 2. The leading German cases, known as the "Soft Drink Bottle
Cases," are based on glass bottles containing carbonated beverages that suddenly
exploded. See infra note 100.
16 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 25, § 402A cmt. b (highlighting
the well-established common-law tradition of holding "those engaged in the business of
selling food intended for human consumption" liable for supplying "'corrupt' food and
drink"); id. § 402A cmt. h (focusing on hallmarks of manufacturing defects such as the
inclusion of "harmful ingredients, not characteristic of the product itself" and
packaging that is "weak, or cracked, or jagged at the edges"); id. § 402A cmt. i
(providing examples of products that are "unreasonably dangerous," such as "bad
whiskey, containing a dangerous amount of fusel oil," "tobacco containing something
like marijuana," and "butter contaminated with poisonous fish oil").
17 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 2 Reporters' Note,
cmt. c (cataloging case law, statutes and scholarly commentary discussing
manufacturing defects).
7' Id. § 2(b).
79 Id. § 2 cmt. d.
80 Id. § 2 Reporters' Note, cmt. d (acknowledging that the complex array of
case law, statutes and scholarly commentary requires a special presentation format for
what is, "by far the longest Reporters' Note to any Comment in this Restatement").
81 Id. § 2(b).
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Additionally, there is a distinct overlap between design and
warning defects. 2 These details are discussed in greater detail
below, in conjunction with the risk-utility analysis used to
establish liability.8
3. Warning Defects
Although the comments to the Restatement (Second)
briefly discuss the necessity of use-specific warnings and
instructions,' warning defects themselves were not officially
defined until the Restatement (Third).' That treatise defines
instruction or warning defects' as those arising when "the
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been
reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions
or warnings by the [manufacturer], and the omission of the
instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably
safe.""7
According to one of the Reporters' Notes, the law
surrounding the duty to provide warnings is "so widely
recognized that extensive citation is unnecessary."' However,
the fact that there is no simple formula for enumerating what
constitutes effective and adequate instructions and warnings
means that a variety of factors come into play when assigning
liability." A discussion of these factors can be found below in
conjunction with the risk-utility standard by which liability is
assigned for warning defects?
82 For further discussion about the overlap between design and warning
defects when assigning liability, see infra Part IV.A.2.
8' See infra Part IV.A.2.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 25, § 402A cmt. h (acknowledging that
a manufacturer "may be required to give adequate warning of the danger[s]" that arise
from a particular use) and cmt. j (acknowledging, in the context of ingestible products,
that a manufacturer may be required to "give directions or warning, on the container,
as to its use" in order to prevent a product from being "unreasonably dangerous").
95 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 2(c).
m Although this Note discusses them under the general heading of warning
defects, the reader should note the distinction between instructions and warnings.
According to comment i, "[i]nstructions inform persons how to use and consume
products safely" while "[wiarnings alert users and consumers to the existence and
nature of product risks so that they can prevent harm either by appropriate conduct
during use or consumption or by choosing not to use or consume." Id. § 2 cmt. i.
87 Id. § 2(c).
88 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 2 Reporters' Note cmt. i.
89 Id. § 2 cmt. i.
90 See infra Part IV.A.2.
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B. Burgerliches Gesetzbuch / German Civil Code
Because of the dual system that has developed as a
result of Section 823's two distinct bases for assigning liability,
under German law there are two different approaches to
defining what constitutes a Fehler (defect). First, similar to the
approach adopted by the Restatement (Third), under
Paragraph I of Section 823 the German courts have developed
three different categories of product defects. In contrast, under
Paragraph II the definition of a defect depends on the
particular statute." The Product Liability Act does not
distinguish between different categories of defect; instead, it
relies on a context-influenced, expectation-based definition.'
1. Section 823 1 BGB
Unlike the U.S. law, and unusual even in German tort
law, products liability cases brought under Paragraph I of
Section 823 require the plaintiff to show that the manufacturer
breached a Verkehrssicherungspflicht (duty of care).93 This is
because unlawful conduct by a manufacturer generally does not
directly constitute a violation of one of Paragraph I's
enumerated rights, namely, life, body, health, or property'
Manufacturers do, however, produce and sell goods, "an
activity that is generally capable of causing danger to the
public."95 This potential for causing danger to the general public
led to the creation, by both the courts and legal scholars, of a
number of duties of care, the breach of which can result in a
violation of one of the absolute rights enumerated in Paragraph
I. These duties of care generally fall into three main categories:
Fabrikations-, Konstruktions- and Instruktionspflichten
(manufacturing, design, and instruction/warning duties).' A
91 For a brief discussion of how defects are defined under the Pharmaceutical
Products Act, see infra note 117.
92 Product Liability Act, supra note 11, § 3.
93 Vieweg, supra note 57, at 218.
Id. Generally, no one's rights are violated and no one is injured simply
because a manufacturer produces a defective product.
95 Id. It is the combination of a manufacturer producing a defective product
and placing that defective product on the market that generally results in the violation
of someone's rights.
Id. Two additional categories have also been recognized - the
Produktbeobachtungspflicht (duty to monitor for defects) and the Rickrufspflicht (duty
to recall). Id. Both of these duties can be viewed as extensions of the duty to warn. The
duty to monitor requires manufacturers to watch for new or newly-discovered defects
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manufacturer becomes liable when, as the result of the breach
of one of these duties of care, one of the absolute rights
enumerated in Paragraph I is violated. In the twenty-two years
between the landmark decision in the Fowl Pest Case97 and the
introduction of the Product Liability Act,98 German courts and
legal scholars used these three duties of care as the premises
for identifying and developing three distinct categories of
defect.' Essentially the same three categories as those
enumerated in the Restatement (Third), they are discussed
individually below.
a. Herstellungsfehlern/Manufacturing Defects
Herstellungs- or Fabrikationsfehlern, which are
essentially manufacturing defects, were the first category of
defect recognized by the German courts.' ° They occur when
based on technological and scientific developments. Id. at 221. In addition to
monitoring developments, manufacturers are required to warn consumers of the newly
discovered potential danger and, if the danger is large enough, manufacturers have a
duty to recall the product. Id. at 221.
97 BGHZ 51, 91.
9' Product Liability Act, supra note 11.
Vieweg, supra note 57, at 218.
'o0 The leading German products liability case, the Fowl Pest Case, BGHZ 51,
91, is a manufacturing defect case. However, the best-known series of cases in this area
is commonly known as the Limonadenflaschen-Flle (Soft Drink Bottle Cases). In one
commonly cited case from this series, BGHZ 104, 323, translated in MARKESINIS &
UNBERATH, supra note 48, at 571-79, the plaintiff was a three-year-old child who was
severely injured when a glass bottle, containing a carbonated soft drink and placed on
the market by the defendants, exploded near his face. Mehrwegflaschen (reusable glass
bottles) are very common in Germany. The bottles are made of relatively thick glass
and are returned by customers after use. The manufacturer then washes and tests
them for defects, after which the bottles are refilled and redistributed for sale. Because
the state of technology could not completely eliminate the possibility of bottle
explosions, the Court found that there was no design defect. Instead, it recognized the
existence of a manufacturing defect and found that the manufacturer had a duty to
prevent any individually defective bottles from leaving the factory. The Court also
found that this duty extended to ensuring that bottles leaving the factory could
withstand normal and foreseeable handling. This duty was breached when the soft
drink manufacturer failed to prevent distribution of individual bottles that were either
dangerous at the time they were placed into circulation or were unable to withstand
the rigors of normal and foreseeable handling. Vieweg, supra note 57, at 219.
Another case in this series provides an excellent example of the two-prong
approach that has developed as a result of the differences in Section 823's two
paragraphs. See BGHZ 129, 353, translated in MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note
48, at 584-89. Yet another, NJW 8, 528, discusses the different burdens of proof faced
by the plaintiff and defendant-manufacturer and reexamines the conditions under
which the burden of proof should be shifted to the manufacturer.
These cases are based on fact patterns that are remarkably similar to the
illustrations provided for manufacturing defects in the Restatement (Third). See
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individual product units, occasionally referred to as Ausreifer
(runaways),'1 have a defect that is the result of either human
error or some kind of technical defect involving the equipment
that is used in the manufacturing process.' These defects
make the individual product unit less safe than others within
the same product line." Because, as in the United States,
manufacturing defects were the first category of defect that
courts recognized, this is currently a relatively quiet area of
German products liability law.'"
b. Konstruktionsfehlern/Design Defects
Unlike manufacturing defects that affect individual
product units, Konstruktionsfehlern (design defects) affect an
entire product line."5 The characteristics that define German
design defects are almost identical to those presented by the
Restatement. Whereas manufacturing defects occur when there
is some kind of deviation from the intended design, design
defects occur because the design itself is somehow defective. As
a result, every product in the line must be considered not "safe
for ordinary use."'
As in the United States, there is a distinct overlap
between design defects and warning defects, discussed below.' 7
Because of this overlap it is sometimes possible for
manufacturers to limit their liability by using instructions or
warnings to limit what can be considered the product's
"ordinary use," thereby compensating for what may actually be
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 2 Reporters' Note, cmt. c, illus. 1 and 2. See also
supra note 75.
'01 Vieweg, supra note 57, at 219.
102 Giinter Schlegelmilch, Anwendugsfdlle des § 823 Abs. 1 BGB, in DER
HAFTPFLICHTPROZE3 477, 478 para. 274 (GUnter Schlegelmilch ed., 23rd ed. 2001).
Defects that are the result of human error are unavoidable. Id. It is precisely for this
reason that manufacturers have a duty to inspect their products before placing them on
the market. Id. at 479.
'm Vieweg, supra note 57, at 218.
'04 Wandt, supra note 49, at 76. For a discussion of the liability-related
aspects of manufacturing defects, see infra Part IV.B.I.a.
10" Vieweg, supra note 57, at 218-19. Although the Fowl Pest Case, BGHZ 51,
91, addressed only manufacturing defects, the German courts have "extended the new
rule to apply also to cases of defective design (see BGHZ 67, 359, 362)." MARKESINIS &
UNBERATH, supra note 48, at 99. 'For interesting illustrations raised by the problem of
defective design see: BGH VersR 1960, 1095; VersR 1967, 498; VersR 1972, 559; NJW
1990, 906." Id. at 100.
' Vieweg, supra note 57, at 218. For a discussion of the liability-related
aspects of design defects, see infra Part IV.B.I.b;
107 See infra Part III.B.1.c.
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a design defect.'08 Because design defects are a "newer" field,
this is currently a fairly active area of German products
liability law.'0 9
c. InstruktionsfehlernfWarning Defects
Currently the "fastest evolving field in German products
liability law,"" °  Instruktionsfehlern (warning/instruction
defects) constitute the third main category of defects recognized
by the German courts."' Consumers have a general duty to "use
products as a reasonably prudent person would do under the
circumstances.."..2 However, where the "average consumer ""'3
cannot be expected to have the knowledge necessary to protect
himself from use-related harm, a reciprocal duty exists in the
100 Vieweg, supra note 57, at 218. It must be noted, however, that warnings
cannot replace the duty to manufacture nondefective products. Wandt, supra note 49,
at 49.
109 Wandt, supra note 49, at 76.
110 Id. at 77.
i An early case focused on the specificity of the warnings a manufacturer is
required to include with a potentially dangerous product. The plaintiff in the case lost
her arm after an anaesthetic, which was intended only for intravenous injection, was
injected into an artery. The Court held that "[ilt has been recognised for a long time by
the practice of the courts that it is the duty of a manufacturer ... to give an effective
warning of specific dangers emanating from a product brought on the market." BGHZ
59, 172, translated in MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 48, at 564-68.
Currently, the best-known series of cases to specifically address warningdefects is commonly referred to as the Kindertee-Falle (Baby Tea Cases). These cases
involve plaintiffs whose baby teeth were seriously damaged as the result of prolonged
sucking on sweetened tea that was marketed as suitable for babies and small children.
The plaintiffs claimed that the tea, which was sold in small bottles that were
"especially designed for continuous sucking" and had been "recommended ... as a good
night drink for children," lacked adequate warnings about the danger of tooth decay.
Vieweg, supra note 57, at 221. The earliest cases in this series dealt with the adequacy
of warnings about use-related risks and warnings placed next to the instructions for
preparation, BGHZ 116, 60, while a later case dealt more specifically with the
adequacy of warnings that were visually separate from the instructions for
preparation, NJW 48, 1286. Wandt, supra note 49, at 77.
The Markesinis treatise contains a translation of one of the more recent
Baby Tea Cases, but its focus is on the applicability of the statute of limitations where
the plaintiff does not know the identity of alternative defendants. See MARKESINIS &
UNBERATH, supra note 48, at 589-92.
112 Wandt, supra note 49, at 77.
1 The degree of knowledge imputed to the "average consumer" depends on
the "expected sophistication" of that user. In other words, different standards apply to
products the manufacturer expects will be used by experts and those expected to be
used by children. Wandt, supra note 49, at 77. Where the product is intended for use by
Fachleute (experts), the manufacturer's duty to warn does not extend to dangers that
lie within the scope of their knowledge. Schlegelmilch, supra note 102, at 479 para.
277. Additionally, where it can be shown that a particular plaintiff knew of the
dangers, breach of the duty to warn is irrelevant. Id.
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manufacturer."4 As a result, manufacturers must provide
consumers with information and warnings that are "linked to
the intended use of the product.""5 Manufacturers must also
warn consumers about potential dangers arising from
unintended but foreseeable uses."'
2. Section 823 II BGB
Because Paragraph II of Section 823 provides a remedy
for the violation of a variety of protective statutes, there is no
set definition of what constitutes a defect."7 It varies depending
on the statute in question, the majority of which focus on the
violation of some standard of care, not on defective products."8
When analyzing the Product Liability Act, it is
important to remember that the focus of the statute is not
product defects, but rather product safety."' It is not concerned
with contract-based merchantability claims or with a product's
"' Hans-Joachim Mertens, Unerlaubte Handlungen, in 5 MUNCHENER
KOMMENTAR ZUM BORGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH § 823 BGB, 1554 para. 284 (Peter
Ulmer ed., 3d ed. 1997).
"" MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 48, at 101. It was the breach of this
duty that gave rise to the Baby Tea Cases.
Manufacturers may satisfy the duty to warn by providing a Kundendienst
(customer service center) staffed by carefully selected, educated and supervised
employees. Schlegelmilch, supra note 102, at 480 para. 277. It must be noted, however,
that any harm that occurs as a result of customer contact with the service center also
falls within the realm of manufacturer liability, even though the product has long-since
been manufactured. Id.
116 Vieweg, supra note 57, at 220. For a discussion of the liability-related
aspects of warning defects, see infra Part IV.B. 1.b.
... The Pharmaceutical Products Act does not specifically define what
constitutes a defect. Instead, manufacturers are liable for "harmful results that go
beyond those which current medical opinion regards as acceptable." MARKESINIS &
UNBERATH, supra note 48, at 102. These harmful results must be linked to the
product's development or manufacturing, and the harm must have arisen despite the
plaintiffs compliance with dosage and other relevant instructions. Schlegelmilch,
supra note 102, at 505 para. 354. Additionally, manufacturers are liable for harmful
results that arise because of inadequate warnings and instructions. INGEBORG
SCHWENZER, DIE UMSETZUNG DER EG-RICHTLINIE ZUR PRODUKT-HAFTPFLICHT IN DER
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 7 (1991).
118 In addition to the Product Liability Act and the Pharmaceutical Products
Act, other protective statutes for which damages may be recovered under Paragraph II
include the Strassenverkehrsgestz (Road Traffic Act), the Gesetz iber die friedliche
Verwendung der Kernenergie und den Schutz gegen ihre Gefahren (Act Relating to the
Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and the Protection Against its Dangers), better known
as the Nuclear Energy Act, the Luftverkehrsgesetz (Air Traffic Act), the
Wasserhaushaltsgesetz (Water Supply Act), and the Haftpflichtgesetz (Strict Liability
Act). MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 48, at 715-16.
"9 ANDREW GEDDES, PRODUCT AND SERVICE LIABILITY IN THE EEC: THE NEW
STRICT LIABILITY REGIME 21-22 (1992).
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fitness for the purpose.' ° Nor is it concerned with specific
duties of care. As a result, instead of recognizing different
categories of defect, the Product Liability Act defines a
defective product as one that "does not provide the safety
which, considering all circumstances, may be expected."''
Accordingly, a defect can be due to "a property of the product
which it could be reasonably expected not to have, as well as a
property which the product does not have but which it could be
reasonably expected to have..' 2
This "notion of defect is very broad"' 3 and can
encompass design, manufacturing, and warning defects.'"
However, one must remember that the definition relates to the
"safety of the product and not only its unfitness for an ordinary
purpose."'0 Because "it relates to consumer expectations in
general and does not include the expectations of the individual
consumer that the manufacturer has no reason to know," the
concept of what constitutes a defect "remains an objective
one."'' Additionally, the Product Liability Act specifies that the
120 Id.
121 Product Liability Act, supra note 11, § 3 (emphasis added).
12 Havemann, supra note 67, at 23. Interestingly, this definition is similar to
the Restatement (Second)'s "definition" of what constitutes a defect. See supra note 67
and accompanying text.
123 Thierry M. Bourgoignie, Product Liability: Old Arguments for a New
Debate?, 1986 EUR. CONSUMER L.J. 6, 11.
14 Schlegelmilch, supra note 102, at 501 para. 328. It should be noted,however, that this broad definition is not broad enough to encompass a manufacturer's
post-manufacturing Produktbeobachtungspflicht (duty to monitor for defects),
discussed supra note 96. SCHWENZER, supra note 117, at 11.
For an interesting comparative discussion about how defects are defined in
the U.K. and Germany, see Best, supra note 20, at para. 41.
125 Bourgoignie, supra note 123.126 Id. The "consumer expectation test" has long been a thorn in the side of
many U.S. products liability scholars and the inclusion of a similar test in the EU
Directive must be the cause of great concern to those same scholars. The reference, in
comment i of the Restatement (Second) § 402A, to a product that is "dangerous to an
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics," RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 25, § 402A cmt. i, was the seed
from which a forest of passionate debates grew about the fairness and effectiveness of
basing the definition of a defect on the expectations of the consumer. The inclusion in
the Restatement (Third) of a very specific definition of what constitutes a "defect" was
intended to bring an end to the on-going debate about using the consumer expectation
test as the sole basis for analyzing whether a product is defective. It must be noted,
however, that although the furor surrounding the consumer expectation test has been
less intense in recent years, its supporters have not been completely silenced. This is
due in large part to two key developments. First, the Restatement (Third) did not
completely eliminate the consumer expectation test; rather, it specifically included it as
a relevant, but not dispositive factor to be considered in determining whether a
product's design is defective. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 2 cmt. g. Second,
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level of safety one can expect must be considered in light of all
of the circumstances.
12 7
Because the Commission wanted this evaluation to
"take place on the basis of general objective criteria . .
regardless of what the consumer (subjectively) expected,' 28 the
Product Liability Act expressly includes the "circumstances" to
be considered when assessing the level of "safety which... may
be expected.'2 9  They include the product's complete
presentation, the product's intended use, and when the product
was placed on the market."'
Under the Product Liability Act, a product defect may
arise because of a product's "presentation.""3 ' In addition to
encompassing warning defects, the "presentation" aspect of the
Product Liability Act also includes every activity by which a
product is presented to the general public and the consumer.
3
To be relevant, however, the presentation must have been
made either by the manufacturer or an authorized third party,
and must go specifically to a consumer's safety expectations. 1
Activities that go to safety expectations include those that both
lower and raise consumer expectations. Safety expectations can
be lowered by warnings about risks related to "improper use..
. foreseeable imprudent use . . . [and] foreseeable misuse" of a
product." Additionally, a producer can raise consumers' safety
despite the Restatement (Third)'s rejection of a product's design being declared
defective solely because it fails to meet consumer expectations, a small minority of
courts, namely Connecticut and Kansas, have explicitly retained the consumer
expectation test as the means by which they analyze design defects. See Potter v.
Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1330 (Conn. 1997) (retaining the consumer
expectation test because it "is now well established in Connecticut strict products
liability decisions"); Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 946 (Kan. 2000)
(summarizing that in Kansas, "whether a design defect in a product exists is
determined using the consumer expectations test").
... Product Liability Act, supra note 11, § 3.
12" Havemann, supra note 67, at 23.
'2 Product Liability Act, supra note 11, § 3(a)-(c). The inclusion of specific
circumstances that are to be considered when evaluating whether or not a product
meets consumers' safety expectations indicates that the "lessons learned the hard
way," Henderson & Twerski, supra note 2, at 2, have not been completely lost on the
Commission.
130 Product Liability Act, supra note 11, § 3(a)-(c).
... Id. § 3(1)(a).
132 Wandt, supra note 49, at 84 (citing HANS JOSEF KULLMAN & BERNHARD
PFISTER, PRODUZENTEN-HAFTUNG § 3604, at 9 (1997)).
133 Id.
'34 Wandt, supra note 49, at 84 (citing CLAUDIUS TASCHNER & EDWIN
FRIETSCH, PRODUKTHAFTUNGS-GESETZ UND EG-PRODUKTHAFTUNGSRICHTLINIE § 3 Rz.
31, 43 (2d ed. 1990)). See BGHZ 116, 60 (67); BGHZ 106, 273 (283).
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expectations by using advertising that specifically describes the
product, its purpose, or particular safety characteristics; by
guaranteeing particular qualities; or by giving product-specific
advice and instructions."' The Product Liability Act also
focuses on the product's reasonably expected use. "In cases
where the producer can expect some atypical use of the
product, he must ... design the product in such a way that it
cannot cause damage."' Additionally, the Product Liability Act
emphasizes the point in time when the product was placed on
the market."7 "This means that the norms at the time [the
product was put on the market] will apply and the fact that
safety norms have subsequently been tightened, or better
production methods have been discovered, does not imply that
the producer must revoke all older products."'" Essentially, a
product cannot be deemed defective simply because a better
product is subsequently placed on the market'39 since it is the
"product's physical state at the time when it was put into
circulation that determines the evaluation.""5 Additionally, this
focus on the product's safety at the time it was placed on the
market generally implies that consumers are not entitled to
expect the same level of safety from older and probably more
worn products that they can expect from new ones.
It is interesting to note how similar each country's three
categories of defect are, not only with respect to the definitions,
but in the manner they developed. Additionally, although it
does not specifically define the concept of a defect, one should
note that the Product Liability Act provides much more
guidance for assessing whether one exists than did
Restatement (Second) § 402A.
It should be noted that, although consumer expectations can be lowered in
regard to the use to which a product may be put, section 14 of the Product Liability Actprevents manufacturers from limiting their liability through instructions or warnings.
Product Liability Act, supra note 11, § 14.
135 Wandt, supra note 49, at 84 (citing Friedrich Graf von Westphalen, Dasdeutsche Produkthaftungs-gesetz, in 2 PRODUKTHAFTUNGSBUCH § 62 Rz. 50 (Friedrich
Graf von Westphalen et al eds., 1991)).
1 Havemann, supra note 67, at 24. No one would expect the manufacturer ofa chair to be held liable when someone, in order to reach something high, stands on the
chair and falls after losing his balance. The manufacturer knows that the chair can bedangerous when so used, but he also knows that no consumer expects him to design
and produce a chair that cannot tip over when someone stands on it. This would mean
the chair was no longer a chair. Schlegelmilch, supra note 102, at 499 para. 312.
137 Product Liability Act, supra note 11, § 9(1)(c).
138 Havemann, supra note 67, at 25.
19 Product Liability Act, supra note 11, § 2.
140 Havemann, supra note 67, at 25 (emphasis added).
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IV. ASSIGNING LIABILITY
The law in both countries recognizes the existence of
different kinds of defects, which raises questions about how to
assign liability. This section discusses how liability is assigned
and who bears the burden of proof depending on the type of
defect identified.
A. Restatement (Third) Torts: Products Liability
The Restatement recognizes the utility and
appropriateness of assigning liability regardless of fault.
'41
However, unlike the Restatement (Second),142 the Restatement
(Third) expressly limits the use of strict liability to cases
involving manufacturing defects.14 Liability for design and
warning defects, as discussed below,'" is subject to a risk-utility
analysis similar to the reasonableness standard used to assign
liability in negligence cases."'
1. Strict Liability
In the civil context, the applicability of strict instead of
fault-based liability has been justified on a number of different
grounds.14 One school of thought generally focuses on the safety
benefits of strict liability, while another generally focuses on
the fairness aspects of holding certain parties strictly liable.'
47
In the context of products liability, the Restatement (Third)
recognizes that the use of strict liability for manufacturing
141 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 2 cmt. a.
142 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 25, § 402A(2)(a) (providing for across
the board assignment of liability even though the manufacturer "has exercised all
possible care").
143 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 2(a) (providing for assignment of
liability for manufacturing defects "even though all possible care was exercised in the
preparation and marketing of the product").
14 See infra Part IV.A.2.
145 Id. § 2(b) (requiring evidence of a "reasonable alternative design" before
liability can be assigned for design defects); id. § 2(c) (requiring evidence that
"foreseeable risks" could be "reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable
instructions or warning" before liability can be assigned for warning defects).
146 DOBBS, supra note 28, § 353 (including theories based on economic
considerations such as compensation, loss spreading and enterprise liability, as well as
those based on deterrence/safety, manufacturer representation, nonreciprocal risk, and
procedural simplification).
147 Id.
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defects generally "foster[s] several objectives..1.. The
Restatement (Third) also recognizes the validity of a number of
arguments in favor of strict liability, including the argument
that strict liability "encourages greater investment in product
safety."'4 It also notes that strict liability "discourages the
consumption of defective products"" because it causes the
purchase price to more accurately reflect the cost of defects.
Additionally, the Restatement (Third) acknowledges that by
eliminating the plaintiffs burden of showing fault, "strict
liability reduces the transaction costs involved in litigating that
issue.""'
However, the Restatement (Third) also acknowledges
the validity of a number of other schools of thought favoring
strict liability. It concedes that the often difficult or impossible
task of proving a manufacturer's negligence justifies strict
liability in a way comparable to the justification behind the
concept of res ipsa loquitur." The Restatement (Third)
recognizes that the burden of paying for the cost of unavoidable
injuries resulting from manufacturing defects should be borne
by all consumers through price increases.5' Finally, it
acknowledges that specifically in the context of manufacturing
defects, malfunctions "disappoint reasonable expectations of
product performance," which further justifies the use of strict
liability in conjunction with them."
Crucially, unlike its predecessor, the Restatement
(Third) specifically limits strict liability to manufacturing
defects. Very early in its discussion of the liability of
manufacturers of defective products, the Restatement (Third)
focuses on the developmental history of products liability law
and, in particular, on the historical association between
manufacturing defects and strict liability."' It explains that
there is a nexus between strict liability and manufacturing
148 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 2 cmt. a.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Res ipsa loquitur ("the thing speaks for itself) is an exception to the
general rule requiring plaintiffs to provide evidence of the defendant's conduct. DOBBS,
supra note 28, § 154, at 370. It is the theory by which common-law courts acknowledge
that the "plaintiffs injury and the immediate events surrounding it can by themselves
show negligence, even though the plaintiff is unable to prove any specific act that was
unreasonably dangerous." Id.
153 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 2 cmt. a.
154 Id.
155 Id. § 1 cmt. a.
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defects because they are the point at which "the concept of
implied warranty, in which negligence is not required, [merges]
with the tort concept of negligence, in which contractual privity
is not required."" At the same time, it also specifies that, while
strict liability is an appropriate standard upon which to base
liability for manufacturing defects, liability for design and
warning defects is "predicated on a different concept of
responsibility," and therefore strict liability is not an
appropriate standard by which to assign liability for those
types of defects."7
2. Risk-Utility
The Restatement (Third) recognizes and discusses in
detail the need to use a standard other than strict liability
when assigning liability for design and warning defects.
158 It
argues that because "[piroducts are not generically defective
merely because they are dangerous," liability for design and
warning defects should depend on a balancing test."9 The risk-
utility test, the balancing test preferred by the Restatement
(Third), first examines the monetary cost of increasing safety
by, for example, redesigning the product, eliminating desirable
features or including additional warnings." It then balances
those costs against the degree of risk faced by the consumer.'
1
Additionally, it recognizes that the consumer must bear some
of the burden of protecting against possible harm because it
116 Id. This is essentially the Court's reasoning in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
157 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 2 cmt. a.
1'8 Id. Because it brings with it burdens of proof similar to those required for
traditional negligence, there are those who strongly disagree with the Restatement
(Third)'s reintroduction of the risk-utility standard as the test by which liability for
design and warning defects is assigned. For a detailed presentation of cases from
jurisdictions that apply the consumer expectations test to design defect cases without
requiring proof of a reasonable alternative design, see id. § 2 Reporters' Note, cmt.
d(II)(d). For an extensive presentation of the views of U.S. legal scholars about the
consumer expectations test, both before and after proposed drafts of the Restatement
(Third) were made public, see id. § 2 Reporters' Note, cmt. d(III)(a)-(b).
159 Id. § 2 cmt. a.
160 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 2 cmt. a. In the end, it is almost
always the consumer who pays the costs associated with both safe and dangerous
products. Consumers of safer products pay for increased safety levels when
manufacturers spread the cost of additional safety measures by marginally increasing
the price of each unit. At the same time, consumers who are injured by dangerous
products are forced to pay, both figuratively and literally, the cost of lower levels of
safety in the form of physical injury, medical expenses, lost wages, etc.
161 .
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may be impossible for the manufacturer to eliminate all risks
at a reasonable cost.2 The Restatement (Third) goes on to
recognize that, in order for the risk-utility analysis to be "fair
and efficient," it must take place in light of the "knowledge of
risks and risk avoidance techniques reasonably attainable at
the time of distribution."'" As such, manufacturers are only
liable for risks that are reasonably foreseeable."
The Restatement (Third) adopted a "reasonableness
standard" as the standard by which the defectiveness of a
product's design should be judged. 6' Under this standard, there
are two predicate elements to liability. The first is the existence
of a reasonable alternative design." The second necessary
element is evidence that the manufacturer's failure to adopt
the alternative design "rendered the product not reasonably
safe.".67 As is the case under the traditional negligence
standard, it is from the perspective of the ubiquitous
"reasonable person" that the reasonableness of the alternative
design, when compared to the existing design, is to be
evaluated."
The Restatement (Third) recognizes a number of factors
to be considered when determining the reasonableness of a
proposed alternative design and whether its omission makes
the product not reasonably safe. These factors include the
"magnitude and probability of the foreseeable risks of harm,"
the instructions and warnings that accompany the product, and
the "nature and strength of consumer expectations regarding
the product, including expectations arising from the product
portrayal and marketing."" Additional consideration may be
given to the benefits and disadvantages of the proposed
alternative design, including the impact it would have on
production costs, 76 the range of consumer choice, and the effect
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 2 cmt. d.
16 Id. Section 2, comment b, discusses the possibility of alternatives to theplaintiffs presentation of a reasonable alternative design as evidence of a design
defect. Id. § 2 cmt. b. These alternatives are beyond the scope of this Note.
167 Id. § 2 cmt. d.
168 Id.
169 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 2 cmt. f.
170 The fact that "the imposition of liability would have a negative impact on
corporate earnings or would reduce employment in a given industry" is not a factor tobe considered when deciding the reasonableness of an alternative design. Id.
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the proposed alternative design would have on "product
longevity, maintenance, repair and esthetics."'' Essentially,
"[slufficient evidence must be presented so that reasonable
persons could conclude that a reasonable alternative could
have been practically adopted."'' However, because the
product's overall safety must be considered, if adopting the
proposed alternative design would have reduced the risk of the
plaintiffs particular harm but would simultaneously have
introduced equal or greater risks to other consumers, adopting
the proposed alternative design cannot be considered
reasonable.'73
The Restatement (Third) explicitly states that
"consumer expectations do not constitute an independent
standard for judging the defectiveness of product designs.'..
And, after recognizing the reliance of some courts on
derivations of the consumer expectation test when evaluating
the defectiveness of a product's design,' it goes on to reiterate
that "consumer expectations do not play a determinative role in
determining defectiveness.' 7. However, the Restatement
(Third) then acknowledges that, in practice, consumer
expectations do influence a consumer's perception of risks and
do relate to the "foreseeability and frequency of the risks of
harm, both of which are relevant" to the definition of design
defects.'77 As a result, the Restatement (Third) ultimately
concedes that, while consumer expectations should not be used
as an independent basis for establishing the defectiveness of a
product design, such expectations "may substantially influence
or even be ultimately determinative on risk-utility balancing in
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
17' RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 2 cmt. g (emphasis added). For a
brief discussion of the rise and fall of the consumer expectation test, see supra note
126.
17' Among the judicial derivations of the consumer expectation test, the
Restatement (Third) recognizes the use of "reasonable consumer expectations" as the
equivalent of "proof of a reasonable, safer design." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1,
§ 2 cmt. g. Other courts allow the "inference of defect" to be "drawn when the incident
is of a kind that ordinarily would occur as the result of product defect" on the grounds
that "products that fail when put to their manifestly intended use disappoint
reasonable consumer expectations." Id.
176 Id. Comment h, however, recognizes that consumer expectations do play a
"special role" in determining whether food products and second-hand products are
defective, thereby allowing consumer expectations to play a key role when analyzing
whether these categories of product are defective. Id. at cmt. h.
117 Id. § 2 cmt. g.
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judging whether the omission of a proposed alternative design
renders the product not reasonably safe.M7 8
The Restatement (Third) also recognizes that there are
times when a manufacturer will be able to show that the
product was, at the time it was sold, the safest on the market.
While this is not conclusive, it does strengthen the
manufacturer's claim that an alternative design could not have
been practically adopted. Thus, the Restatement (Third)
recognizes that a manufacturer may introduce evidence of
"industry practice that bears on whether the omission of an
alternative design rendered the product not reasonably
safe[.]"'' However, while it may be admissible, evidence of
compliance with industry practice is "not necessarily
dispositive."" ° As is the case when a product meets consumer
expectations, conformance with industry practice is not, on its
own, the standard for determining whether a product is
reasonably safe.
The Restatement (Third) also predicates liability for
warning defects upon risk-utility analysis.' It explains that
the burden of proof associated with warning defects requires
the plaintiff to show that the manufacturer failed to provide
adequate warnings or instructions.12 And while this is
fundamentally the same analysis used to assign liability for
design defects, given the multiplicity of circumstances under
which warnings could be considered defective, the Restatement
(Third) concedes that setting forth a concise set of criteria is
very difficult. "ss
The Restatement (Third) emphasizes that
manufacturers "must provide reasonable instructions and
warnings about risks of injury posed by products."" The scope
of adequate warnings extends to the "inherent risks that
reasonably foreseeable product users and consumers would
178 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 2 cmt. g. However, it should be
noted that, even where the danger is open and obvious, thereby belying any arguments
that consumer expectations did not take it into account, it is possible for the plaintiff to
show that an alternative design should have been adopted. Id.
179 Id. § 2 cmt. d.
180 Id.
181 Id. § 2 cmt. i.
182 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 2 cmt i.
18 Id.
184 Id. Where there is no warning many courts have been "willing to presume
or infer that the plaintiff would have heeded a warning." DOBBS, supra note 28, § 367
at 1016.
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reasonably deem material or significant in deciding whether to
use or consume the product."'" Because it is by definition
impossible to warn against specific unforeseeable risks, when
such an event arises the burden lies with the plaintiff to show
that the manufacturer knew or should have known of the risk,
and therefore should be charged with having to warn against
it.'m As for warning about obvious risks, the Restatement
(Third) acknowledges both the logical irony of requiring
warnings under such circumstances and the fact that
"[wiarning of an obvious or generally known risk in most
instances will not provide an effective additional measure of
safety.""7 Additionally, the Restatement (Third) recognizes that
the existence of an obvious danger may go to the question of
whether there is a design defect. 1"
Essentially, the standard for assigning liability for
warning defects turns on whatever constitutes a reasonable
warning under the circumstances. 8' In addition to. what
constitutes the proper scope of the warning, other factors that
the Restatement (Third) suggests include "content and
comprehensibility, intensity of expression, and the
characteristics of expected user groups. " "
B. Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch/ German Civil Code
In principle, Paragraphs I and II of Section 823
approach the issue of liability from opposite ends of the
spectrum. Under the BGB, tort and therefore products liability
law is fault based; strict liability exists only where it is
statutorily created. As a result, in theory, plaintiffs bringing
suit under Paragraph I must prove fault, whereas liability
exists without regard to fault for plaintiffs who use Paragraph
II to bring suit under the Product Liability Act or most of the
other protective statutes. ' In practice, however, this
distinction is not set in stone.
185 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 2 cmt. i.
186 Id. § 2 cmt. m.
'8' Id. § 2 cmt. j.
188 Id. § 2 cmt. j. There can be significant areas of overlap between design and
warning defects. See discussion supra Part III.A.2-3. This is particularly true with
regard to assigning liability.
'89 Id. § 2 cmt. i.190 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 2 cmt. i.
'9' For a brief discussion of how liability is assigned under the Pharmaceutical
Products Act, see infra note 240.
[Vol. 69:31102
2004] E.U. PRODUCTS LIABILITYAND THE RESTATEMENT
1. Section 823 I BGB
a. Strict Liability
"German law is basically dominated by the principle of
fault liability (so-called 'Verschuldensprinzip') whereas strict
liability is regarded as the exception"" and is "generally found
in special statutes outside the BGB.' 93 Despite indications
during the late-nineteenth century that the German legislature
considered moving away from a purely fault-based system of
liability, "the Code refused to be moved from the principle that
liability for fault was the only acceptable basis for any
obligation to compensate the victim."'" As a result of this
tension, the BGB continues to be a stronghold for fault-based
liability into which the legislature infrequently trespasses to
introduce specific but limited instances of strict liability.9 ' The
legislature is usually prompted to act when a specific lawful
activity carries great risk and potential for injury to the
public." Additionally, since 1908 the "German courts have held
the imposition of strict liability to be a matter for the
legislature and not for the judiciary."97 Thus, the combination
of the BGB's general culpability requirements, the legislature's
hesitancy to enact strict liability statutes, and the judiciary's
abdication of responsibility for the judicial expansion of the
concept has resulted in a limited number of situations in which
pure strict liability exists. '
Notwithstanding the BGB's fault-based focus, in recent
years the German courts have made dramatic inroads into
easing the burden on plaintiffs seeking to bring products
liability claims under Paragraph I of Section 823, particularly
in the area of manufacturing defects. Beginning in the late
1960s, as a result of the Fowl Pest Case,"' German courts
shifted the burden of proof in the context of Paragraph I from
the plaintiff to the manufacturer, who must rebut the
192 Jorg Fedtke & Ulrich Magnus, Germany, in UNIFICATION OF TORT LAW:
STRICT LIABILITY 147 (B.A. Koch & H. Kozoil eds., 2002).
"' Id. at 152.
19 MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 48, at 714.
195 Id. at 714-15.
19 FOSTER & SULE, supra note 17, at 275.
197 Vieweg, supra note 57, at 214.
198 For a short list of the best-known German strict liability statutes, see
supra note 118.
19 BGHZ 51, 91.
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presumption of fault. 0 Adopted in large part because of the
"special features of product liability and in particular the
victim's de facto inability to know what was happening in the
manufacturer's enterprise," today's standard for assigning
liability in manufacturing defect cases is one that "greatly
approximates the strict tort liability that is imposed by
American courts.""'
In the case of manufacturing defects, the plaintiff bears
only the burden of demonstrating that the injury "emanated
from the area of the producer's organization and the risks
attendant on it, and that [the injury] resulted from an objective
defect 2 ' of the product which made it unsuitable to be put into
circulation." 3 Once the plaintiff demonstrates this, the courts
shift the burden to the manufacturer and, except in cases
where evidence indicates that the defect may have arisen after
the product was placed on the market, the shift is automatic.204
Essentially, once the plaintiff shows that he was injured by the
manufacturer's defective product, the burden of proof is strict
liability in everything but name.2 5
b. Negligence
As mentioned earlier, under the BGB German tort law
is fault based in principle. Bringing a suit under Paragraph I of
Section 823 is essentially bringing a suit under the negligence
standard. 0 As a result, the general requirement is that fault
must be shown before a court will assign liability. Additionally,
Paragraph I requires the plaintiff to demonstrate the existence
of a causal link between the defendant's conduct and the
plaintiffs harm. 7 This means that the plaintiff must show that
200 MARKESTNIS & UNBERATH, supra note 48, at 98.
201 Id. at 98-99. As discussed in the text accompanying supra note 39, strict
tort liability did not exist in this context in the U.S. until Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
202 An "objective defect" is a deviation from the manufacturer's intended
design. Wandt, supra note 49, at 79.
203 MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 48, at 99.
204 Id.
205 Id. Theoretically, in situations where the manufacturing process is not
fully automated, it is possible for the manufacturer of an individually defective product
to escape liability under section 831, which largely deals with the negligent supervision
of employees. MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 48, at 99. However, in order to do
so the manufacturer must "name every individual involved in the manufacturing
process and prove his 'innocence." Id.
216 Wandt, supra note 49, at 73.
207 Vieweg, supra note 57, at 200.
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the defendant's conduct constituted a negligent or intentional
act or omission that resulted in an unlawful violation of an
enumerated or other right or interest.2"8 In the context of
product liability suits this is usually done by showing that the
manufacturer breached one of the three key duties of care."
Case law has extended the concept of shifting the
burden of proof, which originally applied only to manufacturing
defects, to include design defects.2" However, because the
plaintiffs burden is higher in design defect cases than those
involving manufacturing defects, the shift is less automatic.21'
As a result, although the courts have eased the plaintiffs
burden, the applicable standard for analyzing design defects
remains closer to negligence than to strict liability.
In order to establish a prima facie case and trigger the
shift in a design defect case, the plaintiff must satisfy two
requirements. First, as was the case with manufacturing
defects, the plaintiff must show that the product was defective
"in the sense that the defective design was avoidable given the
existing scientific and technical knowledge."12 This includes
showing that the "product was unsafe by virtue of matters
lying within the producer's sphere of influence."2' The concept
of what makes a product "unsafe" is based on the product
having "objective defects . .. in the sense that the defective
design was avoidable according to existing scientific and
technical knowledge."21' Additionally, manufacturers may be
liable for harm arising from reasonably foreseeable misuse,1'
although liability does not generally extend to harm resulting
from intentional abuse of a product."6
The second requirement is more difficult to satisfy and
is the reason German courts are generally more hesitant when
shifting the burden in design defect cases. In addition to
showing that the product had an objective defect, the plaintiff
must convince the court that the "design was defective in a way
208 Id.
209 See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
210 MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 48, at 99. See generally BGHZ 67,
359.
211 Id. at 99-100.
212 Id. at 100. This is very similar to the alternative design requirement in
U.S. design defect cases. See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.
213 Vieweg, supra note 57, at 218.
214 Id.
211 MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 48, at 100.
216 Vieweg, supra note 57, at 218.
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that it created an unreasonably great risk of danger."1 ' Once
the plaintiff meets these two requirements, the courts shift the
burden from the plaintiff to the manufacturer.2 "8 As a result of
this shift and in order to escape liability, the manufacturer
must prove there was no breach of duty.21
Instead of specifically focusing on the existence of a
reasonable alternative design, as does the Restatement (Third),
the legal issues in German design defect cases tend to center
around whether the design complies with current state-of-the-
art safety standards. " A plethora of regulatory bodies and legal
institutions such as DIN (German Institute for
Standardization) and TUV (Technical Inspection Organization)
bombard manufacturers with rules and standards that
establish minimum safety and technical standards for
everything from nuclear power plants to envelopes.22
Additionally, the Geratesicherheitsgesetz (Act on the Safety of
Technical Equipment), 2 requires "technical equipment"223 to
comply with "generally recognised technical rules and
principles,"224 a broad term for which there is no official legal
definition. However, while compliance with these standards
and regulations will strengthen a manufacturer's case, under
217 MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 48, at 100. One German scholar
neatly summed up the difference between a product that can simply be dangerous, as
opposed to one that is unreasonably so, by observing that a pencil cannot be considered
unnecessarily dangerous merely because another can be injured by it. Schlegelmilch,
supra note 102, at 499 para. 312.
218 Vieweg, supra note 57, at 218.
219 Id.
220 Wandt, supra note 49, at 76.
221 MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 48, at 100. The Deutsches Institut
fir Normung (DIN) (German Institute for Standardization) and Technischer
Uberwachungsverein (TOV) (Technical Inspection Organization) are two of Germany's
best-known standard-setting institutions. In addition to setting safety standards in
Germany, the standards set by both institutions are recognized throughout the world.
The German government has recognized DIN "as the national standards body and [it]
represents German interests at international and European level." See Deutsches
Institut ffir Normung, About DIN, at http://www2.din.de/index.php?lang=en (last
visited Mar. 23, 2004). TOV is a German-based, world-wide organization of
independent inspectors whose name and activities have become "synonymous with
public safety, quality, and environmental protection." See TOY America, About TUV:
History and Background, at http://www.tuvam.com/aboutus/history.cfm (last visited
Mar. 23, 2004).
222 Geratesicherheitsgesetz, v. 24.6.68 (BGB1. I S.717), as amended, v. 18.2.86
(BGBI I. S.265).
223 "Technical equipment" is widely interpreted as encompassing everything
from sports and safety equipment (e.g., mask, helmets, belts) to household appliances,
factory equipment, and even toys. MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 48, at 100.
224 Geratesicherheitsgesetz, supra note 222, § 3; MARKESINIS & UNBERATH,
supra note 48, at 100.
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Paragraph I compliance alone may not constitute a defense if
"actual technical developments have already surpassed these
standards."225
Additionally, when considering design defects, the court
may also "weigh carefully whether an alternative design would
be economically feasible and to what extent it would reduce the
risk of [the harm] occurring."26 In situations where the product
is very inexpensive, the manufacturer may be able to show that
the product's low price makes a safer design impossible,"7 while
more expensive products may be held to a higher standard of
safety.2" This, combined with the focus on what is
technologically feasible, bears a striking resemblance to the
reasonable alternative design test that is the focus of the
Restatement (Third)'s analysis for design defects.
Negligence is also the applicable standard by which to
analyze warning defects. However, unlike manufacturing and
design defects, where the courts have willingly shifted the
burden of proof from the plaintiff to the manufacturer, they
have been less quick to do so where warning defects are
involved.29 This hesitancy to shift the burden is due in large
part to the nature of warning defects themselves and the fact
that plaintiffs bringing a suit based on warning defects are
generally not at the same Beweisnot (evidentiary disadvantage)
as those seeking to bring suits based on design or
manufacturing defects.' In warning defect cases the key piece
of evidence is often simply the presence, or absence, and the
scope of the warnings or instructions. As a result, because
plaintiffs do not normally require access to manufacturing
facilities or other aspects of the manufacturing and design
process that are typically closed to the public, the courts view
the negligence standard as reasonable. Accordingly, they are
less quick to shift the burden of proof.
225 Wandt, supra note 49, at 76-77. This is similar to the U.S. concept of
custom. In contrast, under the Product Liability Act, compliance with mandatory
regulations may provide a defense if a defect is the result of compliance with
mandatory standards. Product Liability Act, supra note 11, § 1(2)(4). See infra note 240
for a brief discussion on the limitations that have been placed on this defense.
226 MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 48, at 100.
227 Wandt, supra note 49, at 79.
228 Id. at 77.
229 THOMAS WINKELMANN, PRODUKTHAFTUNG BEI INTERNATIONALER
UNTERNEHMENSKOOPERATION 62-63 (1991).
230 Id.
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As discussed above,' in relation to the definition of
warning defects, the manufacturer's duty to warn extends not
only to harm that may arise in conjunction with the product's
intended use, but may also extend to warning about the risks
associated with an unintended but foreseeable use. 2 Recent
developments require not only the inclusion of adequate
information about a product's inherent risks, but
manufacturers must also ensure that warnings "emphasize
important information about the risks related to the product
and the functional relationship" between its use and possible
injuries.23
The scope of what constitutes adequate warnings
derives from a variety of factors, including the "expected
sophistication of the user," 21 the right that is likely to be
violated (such as life, body, health), and the degree of danger.
The less sophisticated the user, the more protected the right,
and the greater the danger, the broader the required scope."
Adequate warnings must be clear and specific as to concrete
risks, and the text itself must be obvious enough to ensure that
consumers will read, take seriously, follow, and to a large
extent continue to act in accordance with those warnings.
Once a German court finds that the manufacturer has
breached the duty to warn, there is a rebuttable presumption
that the warning, had it been provided, would have been
heeded.23 Adequate warnings cannot, however, replace the duty
to produce products that are not defective. 238 Therefore, a
manufacturer cannot use warnings as an attempt to escape
liability if a product "does not comply with the Basissicherheit
231 See discussion supra Part III.B.l.c.
232 Vieweg, supra note 57, at 220. For example, when the manufacturer of an
industrial solvent is aware that some people are inhaling solvent fumes to get high, the
manufacturer has a duty to warn of "sniffing" related dangers. Schlegelmilch, supra
note 102, at 490-91 para. 293. Where the manufacturer has complied with the duty to
warn about risks associated with misuse of the product, his liability does not extend to
injuries suffered as a result of such misuse. Id. Additionally, the duty to warn does not
extend to risks arising from misuse that is not even remotely related to the product's
intended use. Id.
233 Wandt, supra note 49, at 77.
234 !d.
235 MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 48, at 101.
238 Schlegelmilch, supra note 102, at 490 para. 292.
237 Vieweg, supra note 57, at 221. If, however, the court finds that the
manufacturer provided adequate warnings, but the consumer failed to read or observe
those warnings, the manufacturer is not liable for the resulting injuries. Schlegelmilch,
supra note 102, at 490 para. 292.
2 Wandt, supra note 49, at 77.
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(basic safety standard) expected by the consumer and the
public at large."'"
2. Section 823 II BGB
As is the case with many of the protective statutes that
may provide a cause of action under Paragraph II of Section
823,240 the Product Liability Act does not follow the BGB's
traditional, fault-based notion of liability. Accordingly, under
the Product Liability Act, once a plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case, the manufacturer of a defective product is held
strictly liable.2 ' Fault plays no role in the analysis and to
escape liability the manufacturer has the burden of showing
either that the product falls within one of the specified
exceptions"2 or the existence of any of the exonerating defenses
contained throughout the Product Liability Act itself.
In order to establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff
must meet her burden of proof as set out in the statute.24 The
plaintiff must show the existence of three fairly standard
elements. First, the plaintiff must show the existence of a
defect.'" Second, the plaintiff must show the existence of
damages.2 " Finally, the plaintiff must establish a causal link
between the defect and the damages.2 6 Once the plaintiff has
made out a prima facie case, the Product Liability Act
automatically shifts the burden of proof to the manufacturer.2 7
This is an improvement over the usual burden of proof
239 Id. at 78.
240 The Pharmaceutical Products Act is a true strict liability statute.
SCHWENZER, supra note 117, at 7. Although development risks are a valid defense
under Paragraph I of Section 823, there is no such provision in the Pharmaceutical
Products Act. As a result, because there is no development risk defense, manufacturers
are liable for harm even if it could not have been prevented according to the current
state of technology and scientific research. SCHWENZER, supra note 117, at 7. The
plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating compliance with manufacturer-provided
warnings and instructions and for demonstrating that it was the manufacturer's
product that caused the harm. Wandt, supra note 49, at 90. Otherwise the burden lies
with the manufacturer.
241 Product Liability Act, supra note 11, § 1(1). Under the Product Liability
Act, the plaintiffs burden of proof is somewhat lower than is required under Paragraph
I. SCHWENZER, supra note 117, at 13.
242 Product Liability Act, supra note 11, § 1(2).
'4 Id. § 1(4).
244 id.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Product Liability Act, supra note 11, § 1(4).
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plaintiffs face under Paragraph I, especially in the case of
warning defects.2 8
Under the Product Liability Act manufacturers can
escape liability by showing either the applicability of one of the
five enumerated exceptions or the existence of specific
exonerating circumstances."9 The enumerated exceptions"
eliminate liability for damage caused by: (1) defective products
that the manufacturer did not place on the market;2"1 (2)
products with defects that did not exist at the time the product
was placed on the market;25 2 (3) products that were neither
manufactured to be sold or otherwise distributed nor
manufactured or sold as part of manufacturer's business;21 (4)
products that were in compliance with mandatory legal
standards at the time they were placed on the market;2' and (5)
products with a defect that was undetectable based on the state
of the art at the time the product was placed on the market. 5
'8 SCHWENZER, supra note 117, at 13-14.
249 According to one scholar, none of the enumerated exceptions included in
the Product Liability Act are exceptional enough to warrant serious discussion. Id. at
12.
"0 Product Liability Act, supra note 11, § 1(2). An additional exception
specifically exempts component manufacturers from liability for damage that was
caused not by the component, but by defective construction or instructions by the
manufacturer of the product into which the component was incorporated. Id. § 1(3).
211 Id. § 1(2)(1). This could happen, for example, when a product is stolen and
is placed on the market by someone other than the manufacturer, or when someone is
testing a product and, without the manufacturer's permission, gives it to an
unauthorized person. Schlegelmilch, supra note 97, at 497 para. 301.
252 Product Liability Act, supra note 11, § 1(2)(2). "If it is unclear when the
product became defective, the dispute will be decided by weighing the circumstances."
Wandt, supra note 49, at 89. The manufacturer may, however, be held liable under
Paragraph I if the defect appears after the product is placed on the market and the
manufacturer breaches the duty to monitor and recall. Schlegelmilch, supra note 102,
at 497 para. 302.
'5 Product Liability Act, supra note 11, § 1(2)(3). This eventuality will
generally be covered by the first exception, namely that the manufacturer did not place
the product on the market. Schlegelmilch, supra note 102, at 497 para. 303.
25 Product Liability Act, supra note 11, § 1(2)(4). It should be noted that this
exception is not a complete defense. Wandt, supra note 49, at 87. Additionally, this
defense is "limited by the narrow meaning of detailed mandatory rules," and the
requirements for this defense are not met by the "DIN or other privately issued
industry rules, which only give recommendations for a safety standard." Id.
255 Product Liability Act, supra note 11, § 1(2)(5). Although member states had
the option of holding manufacturers liable for so-called development risks, the German
legislature was one of the driving forces behind the inclusion of this defense.
SCHWENZER, supra note 117, at 12-13. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that
they chose to include it in the Product Liability Act. Id. Except for the Pharmaceutical
Products Act, which does not provide for use of the development risk defense, this is a
generally accepted defense in German tort law. Id. at 13. Additionally, it must be noted
that the development risk defense is only applicable to design defects. Schlegelmilch,
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Additionally, manufacturers may reduce or escape
liability by showing the existence of exonerating circumstances.
The specific exonerating circumstances that allow a
manufacturer to escape liability appear throughout the Product
Liability Act. However, it should be noted that, as in the
United States, liability cannot be waived or limited in advance,
even if the parties contractually agree to do so."' Under the
Product Liability Act, the contributory negligence of the injured
party may reduce and in some cases eliminate the
manufacturer's liability, 7 but not where the damage is caused
by both the defective product and the acts of a third party."8
Among the other exonerating circumstances that the Product
Liability Act specifically includes are two statutes of limitation.
The first, referred to as a "prescription period,".. requires
plaintiffs to bring suit within three years of learning of the
damage, the existence of a defect and the identity of the
responsible party.6 The prescription period, which is tolled
during settlement negotiations,"' also applies if the plaintiff
should have but failed to discover the damage, defect, and
identity within that same period."2 The Product Liability Act
also includes a second statute of limitation, known as the
"liability period."" Although based on different criteria, the
liability period also sets an expiration date for claims brought
under the Product Liability Act. It provides that a
manufacturer's liability expires ten years after the product was
placed onto the market." The ten-year liability period is tolled
supra note 102, at 497 para. 305. It can never be used to escape liability for
manufacturing defects, even when such defects are technically unavoidable. Id.
256 Product Liability Act, supra note 11, § 14.
257 Id. § 6(1).
25 Id. § 6(2).
259 Commission Report, supra note 6, at 20-21.
260 Product Liability Act, supra note 11, § 12(1). Under section 852 the statute
of limitations for general tort cases, including those brought under Paragraph I of
section 823, is "three years from the time the injured party discovers the damage and
the tortfeasor. Regardless of the victim's knowledge, the absolute cut-off period is 30
years." Vieweg, supra note 57, at 226.
261 Product Liability Act, supra note 11, § 12(2).
262 Id. § 12(1).
20 Commission Report, supra note 6, at 20-21.
26 Product Liability Act, supra note 11, § 13(1). In its Green Paper issued in
advance of its report on the application of the Product Liability Directive, the EU
Commission explored the possibility of extending the liability period with regard to
particular product sectors such as pharmaceuticals, agricultural products, foodstuffs
and other products intended for long-term use or consumption because of the
possibility of latent injuries first appearing many years after the product is placed on
the market. Commission Report, supra note 6, at 20-21.
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when a suit is pending,' after a final judgment has been
handed down, or once the parties have agreed to a binding
settlement. ' Additionally, to ensure that the Product Liability
Act is not applied retroactively, liability does not extend to
products placed on the market before January 1, 1990, the date
the statute took effect.67
V. ANALYSIS
There is, admittedly, a striking similarity between the
Product Liability Act and the Restatement (Second) when it
comes to the vagueness with which defects are defined. This is
due in large part to the fact that each focuses on consumer
safety rather than defective products. As a result of this focus,
both the Product Liability Act and the Restatement (Second)
hold manufacturers strictly liable for the harm caused by their
defective products; fault plays no role in the analysis. For these
reasons it is not difficult to understand why Professors
Henderson and Twerski bemoaned the fact that "the lessons
learned the hard way in the United States have in certain
important aspects been lost on the international legal
community."'
There are, however, substantive differences between the
Product Liability Act and the Restatement (Second) that
indicate that these lessons have not been completely lost on the
Commission. The first is the inclusion of specific circumstances
that must be considered when determining whether, because it
"does not provide the safety which a person is entitled to
expect, taking all circumstances into account," 9 a product is
defective. This indicates that those who drafted the EU
Green Papers are communications on a specific policy area that are
published by the Commission as a means of initiating a European-wide process of
consultation and debate. See Europa: Gateway to the European Union, Glossary: Green
Paper, at http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/legen/cigtg4000g.htm (last visited Mar. 24,
2004). Generally addressed to parties, organizations and individuals who have a
special interest in the topic at hand, Green Papers can provide impetus for both
changes in current legislation and proposals for subsequent legislation. Id. Concrete
proposals resulting from a Green Paper are often presented as official proposals in the
form of a White Paper. See Europa: Gateway to the European Union, Glossary: White
Paper, at http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/cig/g4000w.htm (last visited Mar. 24,
2004).
26 Product Liability Act, supra note 11, § 13(l).
2r Id. § 13(2).
267 Id. § 16.
26' Henderson & Twerski, supra note 2, at 2.
26 Product Liability Act, supra note 11, § 3(1).
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Directive were aware of the difficulties that arose in the United
States as a result of an undefined, very subjective consumer
expectation test and, as a result, sought to ensure that their
test was an objective one. The second difference indicating an
awareness of the difficulties associated with the Restatement
(Second), in particular holding manufacturers strictly liable, is
evidenced by the inclusion of specific defenses2°  and
exonerating circumstances,2' as discussed above, by which
manufacturers may escape liability. In addition to these
restrictions on an otherwise broad provision, the Product
Liability Act also includes a number of procedural limitations
on both the statute's applicability and on the amount of
damages that may be awarded.
These procedural limitations take a variety of forms.
For instance, liability for property damage is limited to
property that "by its nature is ordinarily intended for private
use or consumption and was mainly so used."72 Additionally, in
the case of property damage there is a deductible of 
€500... that
must be absorbed by the plaintiff. 4 Another limitation includes
a cap on the producer's total liability under the Product
Liability Act."' This total liability cap, set at C85 million,
applies where personal injuries are "caused by a product or by
identical products with the same defect."76 Finally, recovery for
270 See id. § 1(2).
... See id. §§ 6, 12, 13, 16.
272 Id. § 1(1).
273 On March 30, 2004, 
€1.00 bought $1.21. At this exchange rate, C500 was
worth approximately $607. See Economist, Full Converter, at
http://www.economist.com/markets/currency (last visited Mar. 30, 2004). Legislative
changes adjusted this amount from DM1,125 to C500 in accordance with the
introduction of the common currency on January 1, 2002. See Zweites Gesetz zur
Anderung schadenersatzrechtlicher Vorschriften (Schadensrecht;nderungsgesetz), v.
19.7.2002 (BGB1. I S.2674), art. 9, para. 3.
274 Product Liability Act, supra note 11, § 11 (as amended by the
Schadensrechtanderungsgesetz, supra note 273). A perfect example of the
complications caused by the German legal system's dual approach to tort law, this
deductible may be recovered if the plaintiff can show negligence under Paragraph I.
SCHWENZER, supra note 111, at 22-23. In both the U.K. and the Netherlands, this
deductible acts more like a minimum threshold plaintiffs must reach before they can
bring suit. Id. And, under those versions of the EU Directive, once the threshold has
been met, the full amount may be recovered. Id.
... Product Liability Act, supra note 11, § 10.
276 Id. § 10 (amended by Schadensrechtanderungsgesetz, supra note 273). On
March 30, 2004, C1.00 bought $1.21. At this exchange rate 
€85 million was worth
approximately $103.2 million. See Economist, Full Converter, supra note 273. This cap
was seen by some as a necessary measure required to compensate for the expansion of
liability. SCHWENZER, supra note 117, at 18. However, some think that the legislature
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personal injury was originally limited to the cost of treatment
and financial loss caused by temporary or permanent loss of
earning capacity. 7  As with most protective statutes,
Schmerzensgeld (damages for pain and suffering) could not be
recovered without an independent showing of fault under
Paragraph I of Section 823. However, in a radical alteration of
long-standing public policy that required a showing of fault
before such damages could be awarded, the German legislature
recently amended a number of protective statutes, including
the Product Liability Act, to allow for recovery of damages for
pain and suffering without an independent showing of fault."'
While the above restrictions and limitations may not be
the same solutions reached by the U.S. legal system, to date
they seem to be working. There has not been an explosion of
products liability claims with astronomical damage awards, as
there was in the United States during the 1980s and 1990s.
Nor, as discussed below, has there been a great clamor for
changes in the way defects are defined and liability is
assigned.79
Additionally, should the Commission decide that the
safeguards incorporated into the Products Liability Act no
longer provide stability and predictability, it need not cross the
Atlantic for a competent and comprehensive guide to products
liability law. The other prong of German products liability law,
as developed under Paragraph I of Section 823, can provide the
Commission with guidance that is substantially similar to that
provided by the Restatement (Third). When one views this
source in conjunction with German procedure, it may indeed
prove to be a more appropriate source than the Restatement
(Third) for further development of European law.
Both the German courts under Paragraph I and the
Restatement recognize the same three categories of defects.
Additionally, the definitions of the categories and the methods
by which liability is assigned for each category are surprisingly
similar. Manufacturing defects, the first category to be
recognized in both the United States and Germany, arise when
individual product units depart from their intended design. As
is the case in the United States, in Germany the focus is not on
may have exceeded its mandate by including in the cap damages caused by a single
product. Id. at 19.
277 Product Liability Act, supra note 11, § 8.
218 See Schadensrechtinderungsgesetz, supra note 273.
279 See infra Part VI.
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how such defects can be avoided. This is due in large part to
the fact that manufacturing defects are often unavoidable
either because of the current state of technology or because
human error is itself unavoidable. Instead, the focus in both
countries is on having safeguards in place that prevent
products with manufacturing defects from reaching the
market. Where these safeguards fail the manufacturer will be
held liable.
When it comes to assigning liability for manufacturing
defects the Restatement (Third) simply holds manufacturers
strictly liable. Because the German courts are, in theory,
prevented from applying strict liability where it is not
prescribed by a statute, they are technically required to find
fault before they can shift the burden of proof to the
manufacturer. In reality, once a plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case, the German courts shift the burden almost without
hesitation. Only where there is evidence that the defect arose
after the product was out of the manufacturer's realm of
control is the shift less than automatic. Essentially, in
Germany, as in the United States, manufacturers are strictly
liable for manufacturing defects.
Whereas manufacturing defects, as treated under
Paragraph I of Section 823 and defined by the Restatement
(Third), are almost mirror images, the similarities between the
manner in which the two systems analyze design defects is less
obvious. This does not, however, mean that they are not
substantially similar. In both Germany and the United States,
design defects are defined as defects that affect entire product
lines. They arise not when an individual product unit deviates
from its intended design, but when the product's design itself is
somehow defective. When assigning liability for design defects,
the Restatement (Third) focuses on defects that arise because
of the manufacturer's failure to incorporate a reasonable
alternative design, while the German focus is on defects that
were avoidable given the current state of technology. Although
there are differences between these two standards, because the
cost of the product is also an important factor in the German
analysis, the differences are more procedural than substantive.
While the Restatement (Third) requires evidence of an
alternative design, German plaintiffs must show that the
defect was objectively avoidable according to existing
technological and scientific knowledge. While the Restatement
(Third) requires a showing that the manufacturer's failure to
adopt the alternative design made the product unreasonably
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unsafe, the German analysis extends to include the economic
practicalities of incorporating an alternative design that is
technologically feasible, and also considers the extent to which
the alternative design would reduce the risk presented by the
current design. In short, before liability can be assigned, both
the Restatement (Third) and the German courts rely on an
objective risk-utility test that focuses on alternatives to the
current design.
The similarities also extend to the third category of
defects - warning defects. In both countries warning defects
arise when a manufacturer fails to provide consumers with
warnings or instructions that adequately convey the risks
related to the use and foreseeable misuse of the product. There
is not, either under Paragraph I of Section 823 or in the
Restatement (Third), an exact formula for what constitutes
adequate or reasonable instructions, but analysis of warning
defects in both countries focuses on a variety of factors ranging
from the expectations and characteristics of the average
consumer, to the obviousness and severity of the risks
associated with the product. Essentially, both the Restatement
(Third) and the German courts expect warnings and
instructions to be comprehensive enough to ensure that the
target consumer will be aware of the risks associated with the
product's intended use as well as those associated with its
reasonably foreseeable misuse. Additionally, in both the United
States and Germany, those warnings and instructions must be
simple enough for the consumer to understand, obvious enough
that the consumer will read them and reasonable enough that
it is likely that the consumer will follow them should he decide
to use the product. In short, neither the Restatement (Third)
nor the German courts can enumerate exactly what it is that
makes warnings and instructions adequate, but they both
know it when they see it.
Although there may be differences in the nuances
relating to each of these three categories, in principle they are
substantively very similar. As a result, the Commission should
not feel compelled to seek guidance from the Restatement
simply because the United States has been on a products
liability roller coaster since the mid-1960s. While the
Restatement may speak with the authority of those who have
learned these lessons the hard way, that should in no way
diminish the valuable lessons that can be learned from those
who have learned their lessons in a less harsh environment.
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Additionally, it is the job of the Commission to develop
laws that will be applied within the context of almost
exclusively civil law systems. The fact that German products
liability law, which developed under traditional civil law
principles as espoused by the BGB, has a proven track record of
functioning in conjunction with civil law procedure should
make it all the more appealing. In contrast, the principles
espoused by the Restatement have developed under a very
different procedural system. With this in mind, there are many
scholars, particularly in Europe, who believe that it is the U.S.
procedural law - not substantive law - that has been at the
root of many of the hard lessons that provided much of the
material for the Restatement (Third).'m
As discussed above in conjunction with the Product
Liability Act, the Commission saw fit to include a number of
procedural limitations on both the applicability of and amount
of damages recoverable under the statute. Similar procedural
limitations have been placed on non-statutory law such as
Paragraph I of Section 823. And it is very possibly the
existence of these procedural limits that have allowed the
German law, although substantially very similar to the
Restatement, to develop without being subjected to many of the
extremes that have marked the development of U.S. products
liability law.
There are five basic procedural differences that
significantly influence German product liability law."' First,
unlike U.S. attorneys, German attorneys cannot work on a
contingency-fee basis."' They are required to remain within
both the high and low end of client billing as provided by a
government-issued billing schedule.' As a result, German
attorneys are not motivated by the prospect of receiving a
percentage of large damage awards." Second, German
procedure severely limits both the duration and scope of
discovery and largely places the process in the hands of the
20An example of an excellent discussion of why, from the German
perspective, the combination of German procedural law and "American-style"
substantive products liability law will not result in a "products liability crisis," see
Borer, supra note 68, at 105.
281 What follows is a very brief discussion of some of the major differences in
German and U.S. legal procedure. Unfortunately, a more in depth analysis is beyond
the scope of this Note.
282 Borer, supra note 68, at 130-32.
2M3 Id.
28 Borer, supra note 68, at 130-32.
1117
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
judge.86 By contrast, U.S. procedure allows for exhaustive
discovery and judges are rarely involved in a capacity more
invasive than that of supervisor.' This has a definite and
dramatic impact on not only the amount of information parties
can collect, but also the time in which they have to do it. 7
Third, German procedure makes the judge, or a panel of
judges, both the finder of law and the finder of fact.' U.S.
procedure usually places the parties before a jury. As a result,
the ability of German plaintiffs to play "the sympathy card" is
severely restricted. Additionally, while juries are instructed to
focus only on the issue at hand, judges often include larger
policy issues in their reasoning. Fourth, German procedure
operates on a "loser pays" system while U.S. procedure
generally requires each party to pay its own legal costs.' This
often discourages German plaintiffs from coming forward with
anything other than very strong claims and allows German
defendants to effectively intimidate potential plaintiffs with the
threat of having to pay exorbitant court costs should they
lose." Finally, unlike U.S. procedure, German procedure does
not recognize punitive damages.291 This, in combination with
the disparity between the U.S. and German social safety nets -
in the United States soaring medical expenses can easily
bankrupt a plaintiff, while in Germany most medical and
disability costs are automatically covered by social service
agencies - means that many potential German plaintiffs view
the possible benefits of bringing a products liability suit as
being far outweighed by the risks involved."
Because most of EU member states have a civil law
tradition, they have similar procedural restrictions. 3
Substantive German products liability law, as it developed
under Paragraph I of Section 823, also developed under these
procedural conditions. Because it so closely resembles the law
as presented in the Restatement (Third) and because it will be
applied in conditions that are very similar to those in
285 Id. at 133-36.
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 Id. at 136-39.
289 Borer, supra note 68, at 136-39.
o Id. at 139-40.
21 Id. at 141-46.
292 Id.
23 See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE,
LATIN AMERICA, AND EAST ASIA 125-62, 1014, 1020, 1022, 1026-27 (1994).
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Germany, the Commission should look to German law when
seeking guidance for future substantive changes to EU
products liability law.
VI. CONCLUSION
In January 2001, the Commission issued its Report on
the Application of Directive 85/374 on Liability for Defective
Products." Despite having presented a Green Paper295 soliciting
comments from throughout the EU, based on the feedback it
received the Commission concluded that it "would be
premature to envisage any changes to the current liability
system under" the EU Directive." However, should the
Commission ever decide that EU products liability law needs to
undergo "significant adjustments," it will not be necessary to
look as far afield as the Restatement (Third). German products
liability law, at least in the areas of defining product defects
and assigning liability, can provide the Commission with
substantive guidance that is very similar to the law as set forth
in the Restatement (Third). Additionally, because the German
substantive law has developed within the procedural confines
of a civil law system, it may be easier to adapt to fit the EU's
procedural requirements than would be the Restatement's
common-law based standards.
Rebekah Rollo'
Commission Report, supra note 6.
25 For the definition of a Green Paper, see supra note 264.
296 Commission Report, supra note 6, at 28.
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